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Kosovo is like so many post-conflict societies. Having survived a
devastating war, the region found itself home to a new cadre of
leaders intent on re-establishing order. In the name of peace and
security, these new leaders used the state of turmoil of the post-war
environment to centralize their powers. In efforts to normalize
society, they rounded up those suspected of ethnic hate crimes and
placed them in indefinite detention. Despite the expiration of
detention orders and judicial condemnations of such devices,
detainees languished in prison while those in power continued to
proclaim their commitment to human rights standards from the
perspective of state immunity. While the scene may be reminiscent of
the ascent of warlords and rebel fighters into power, there is one
striking difference in Kosovo. These leaders were not warlords or
rebel fighters; they were representatives of the United Nations
(“U.N.”). With no systems in place to check the U.N.’s behavior, the
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harbinger of human rights had now become its leading defaulter:
immune and unaccountable.
INTRODUCTION
As the example of Kosovo illustrates, questions of U.N.
1
accountability have arisen as the U.N. takes a leading role in
2
response to international crises. Since its inception, the U.N. has
3
engaged in more than fifty peace-keeping operations and thirteen
4
peace-building missions. To permit the U.N. to function quickly and
efficiently in politically unstable environments, the Security Council

1. See Fredrick Rawski, To Waive or Not To Waive: Immunity and Accountability in
U.N. Peacekeeping Operations, 18 CONN. J. INT’L L. 103, 125 (2002); see also Carla
Bongiorno, A Culture of Impunity: Applying International Human Rights Law to the United
Nations in East Timor, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 623, 676-77 (2002); David
Marshall & Shelley Inglis, The Disempowerment of Human Rights-Based Justice in the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 95 (2003); Ralph Wilde,
Accountability and International Actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor,
7 INT’L L. STUDENTS ASS’N J. INT’L & COMP. L. 455, 455 (2001).
2. See Laurence I. Rothstein, Note, Protecting the New World Order: It is Time to
Create a United Nations Army, 14 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 107, 112 (1993)
(noting the growing need for U.N. peacekeeping intervention). See generally David
Bills, Note, International Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention:
The
Ramifications of Reform on the United Nations’ Security Council, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 107,
108-09 (1996) (arguing that the Security Council’s growing interest in addressing
human rights abuses has meant increased U.N. involvement in international crises);
Rajendra Ramlogan, Towards a New Vision of World Security: The United Nations Security
Council and the Lessons of Somalia, 16 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 213, 258-59 (1993) (advocating
that the U.N. take a preventive approach to pending international crises in order to
avoid continued strains on its ability to effectively maintain peace). See also Yogesh K.
Tyagi, The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention Revisited, 16 MICH. J. INT’L L. 883, 898
(1995) (arguing that the U.N. has responded to international humanitarian crises
without adequate attention to its capacities as an organization).
3. See United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations, Background Note: June 18, 2003, U.N. Doc. DPI/1634/Rev.29
(2003) (noting that since 1948 the U.N. has been involved in 56 operations,
including 14 current operations costing $28.74 billion), available at
http:/www.un.org/peace/bnote010101.pdf (last visited September 3, 2003) (on file
with the American University Law Review).
4. See United Nations Department of Public Information, United Nations Political
and Peace-Building Missions, Background Note:
June 15, 2003, U.N. Doc.
DPI/2166/Rev.8 (2003) (indicating that nearly 400 international civilian personnel
and over 600 local civilian personnel have been involved in the operations), available
at http:/www.un.org/peace/ppbm.pdf (last visited September 3, 2003) (on file with
the American University Law Review); see also International Peace Academy,
Transitional Administrations, U.N. State Building Missions Since 1945 [hereinafter IPA,
Transitional Administrations Chart] (listing the types of state functions assumed by
the
U.N.
in
its
missions
over
the
last
half
century),
at
http://www.ipacademy.org/Programs/Research/ProgReseTransAdmin_Print.htm
(last visited July 26, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). The
chart demonstrates that more recent missions have seen expanded U.N. authority
into the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Id. In the case of the U.N.’s
work in East Timor, the IPA notes that the interim administration even had treatymaking powers. Id.
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has granted U.N. officials broad authority. In recent missions,
regulations authorized legislative, executive and some judicial
6
authority in U.N. actors, allowing these individuals to operate as the
7
new state administrators.
At the same time that the U.N. and its agents have become state
actors, they are not bound by the same human rights standards
8
required of States. Although the U.N. has recently acknowledged
9
the relevance of these standards in the administration of a territory,
5. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4057th mtg. at 2-3, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1272 (1999) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution 1272] (authorizing the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”), the Mission in East
Timor, to “take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate”).
6. See generally UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Interim
Administration in Kosovo, § 2 (July 25, 1999) [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 1999/1]
(stating “[a]ll legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including
the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the
Special
Representative
of
the
Secretary-General”),
available
at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg01-99.htm (on file with the
American University Law Review); U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5, at 2
(establishing UNTAET, “which will be endowed with overall responsibility for the
administration of East Timor and will be empowered to exercise all legislative and
executive authority, including the administration of justice”).
7. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 632 (noting that in many situations the U.N.
has undertaken partial or total sovereign powers in its missions in regions such as
Namibia, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo and East Timor). See generally Sir
Robert Jennings, Sovereignty and International Law, in STATE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 30-31 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002) (discussing the void
filled by the U.N. in areas that lack governments with centralized power such as
Bosnia and Kosovo).
8. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 644-47 (finding that in the past, the U.N. has
claimed that it could not be formally bound by international humanitarian law
because it could not consent to the conventions). Because it cannot consent, the
U.N. required participating States to train the State’s incoming U.N. personnel. Id.
In 1993, the U.N. took over training its forces in humanitarian practices in Rwanda,
but did not give a clear definition of what that entailed. Id. at 646-47.
9. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 2 (providing that, “[i]n
exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or holding public
office in Kosovo shall observe internationally recognized human rights standards and shall
not discriminate against any person on any ground such as sex, race, color, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, association with
a national community, property, birth or other status”) (emphasis added); UNMIK
Regulation 1999/24, On the Law Applicable in Kosovo, § 1.1 (Dec. 12, 1999)
[hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 1999/24] (listing the internationally recognized
human rights standards to which public officials acting in their official capacities
would
be
beholden),
available
at
http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm (on file with the American University Law Review);
see also UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, On the Authority of the Transitional Administration
in East Timor, § 2 (Nov. 27, 1999) [hereinafter UNTAET Regulation 1999/1]
(providing more guidance than UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 by enumerating the
applicable
international
standards
in
its
resolution),
available
at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/untaetR/etreg1.htm (on file with the American
University Law Review). Section 2 of UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 provides that:
[i]n exercising their functions, all persons undertaking public duties or
holding public office in East Timor shall observe internationally recognized
human rights standards, as reflected, in particular, in:
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traditional human rights conventions and treaties, to which States are
10
are not legally enforceable on international
beholden,
11
Furthermore, U.N. regulations grant blanket
organizations.
privileges and immunities to actors within these organizations,
making it unclear how, and by whom, international human rights
standards will be enforced on U.N. personnel in humanitarian
12
missions.
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 10 December 1948;
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16
December 1966 and its Protocols; The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 16 December 1966; The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of
21 December 1965; The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women of 17 December 1979; The Convention
Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment of 17 December 1984; The International Convention on
the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989.
They shall not discriminate against any person on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic
or social origin, association with a national community, property, birth or all
other status.
Id.
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 301(2) (1987) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT] (explaining that “‘party’ means a State or international organization
that has consented to be bound by the international agreement and for which the
agreement is in force”). States are only bound to international standards when they
express consent to the convention or treaty. Id. However, even without their
consent, States may be bound to international standards when these standards have
reached the level of peremptory norms. Id. § 102, cmt. k. Some human rights
principles have become universally accepted, such as the prohibition of genocide,
war crimes, and aircraft hijackings. Id. § 404.
11. Id. For the purposes of this Comment, the term “international organizations”
will refer to inter-governmental organizations unless otherwise specified.
12. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, On the Status, Privileges and Immunities of
KFOR and UNMIK and their Personnel in Kosovo (Aug. 18, 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK
Regulation 2000/47] (granting U.N. personnel immunity when they are acting
within their official capacity), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/2000/reg47-00.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
The Regulation grants broad immunity to members of KFOR and UNMIK that
extends even after the expiration of the mission. Id. § 5. The Secretary-General,
however, may waive immunity in any case, and the regulation does provide some
remedies for third party liability. Id. §§ 6-7. Third party claims for “property loss or
damage and for personal injury, illness or death, arising from or directly attributed
to KFOR, UNMIK or their respective personnel and which do not arise from
‘operative necessity’ of either international presence, shall be settled by Claims
Commissions established by KFOR and UNMIK . . . .” Id. § 7. Compare id. §§ 2, 3
(outlining the immunities of KFOR and UNMIK), with U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244
(1999) [hereinafter U.N. Resolution 1244], at 11(j) (emphasizing the mission’s
commitment to human rights) and UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, supra note 9, § 2
(describing the international standards applicable to interim personnel). It is
unclear how the commitment to human rights comports with the grant of privileges
and immunities in interim administrations and whether a viable claims commission
has been established. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SECOND ANNUAL
REPORT 2001–2002 2 (2002) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON ANNUAL REPORT 2002]
(reporting a lack of public information regarding UNMIK and KFOR supported
claims commissions designed to address human rights violations), available at
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The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (“UNMIK”) exemplifies the
13
problems created when centralizing authority. As a consequence of
14
the lack of adequate institutional checks in international missions,
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (“SRSG”)
15
continued to unlawfully detain suspected criminals.
UNMIK
16
justified the use of this practice despite condemnation from human
17
rights groups and the Kosovo judiciary. Beyond inequitable results
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/Final%202%20Annual%
20Report%202002%2010-07-2%20English.doc (on file with the American University
Law Review).
13. See, e.g., Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Mission in
Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Report 2-The Development of the
Kosovo Judicial System: June 10–Dec. 15, 1999 (Dec. 17, 1999) [hereinafter OSCE,
LSMR 2] (recognizing that defendants in pre-trial custody waited for up to six
months for judicial proceedings because of serious problems in the administration
of, and the resources available to, the Kosovo judiciary), available at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/report2.htm (on file with
the American University Law Review).
14. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, THE
CONFORMITY OF DEPRIVATIONS OF LIBERTY UNDER ‘EXECUTIVE ORDERS’ WITH
RECOGNISED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS 8 (2001) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON,
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3] (recommending the creation of judicial panels composed, at
least in part, of international judges who could review the SRSG’s conformity to
human rights standards), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/
spec%20reps/pdf/sr3.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review); see also
Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent Despotism: A Critique of U.N. State-Building in East
Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1101, 1107-08 (2001) (identifying tensions within
the directives of the U.N. mandate for East Timor since the U.N. has a dual role of
building institutional capacity while administering the region as a governorship).
One task emphasizes distribution of responsibility while the other emphasizes
centralization of authority. Id.
15. See generally OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14, at 5
(reviewing the SRSG’s violation of international guidelines for detention); Press
Release, Amnesty International, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Kosovo), Amnesty
International Calls for an End to Executive Orders of Detention (Aug. 3, 2001)
[hereinafter Amnesty, Executive Orders] (condemning SRSG Hans Haekkerup for
violation of the rights of detainees under Article 5 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, or “ECHR”), available
at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700172001?open&of=ENG-2EU
(on file with the American University Law Review). The press release specifically
stated that the executive orders violated the detainees’ rights because detainees were
not notified about the reason for their arrest, did not have a chance to seek judicial
review, could not challenge the legality of the action, and were not afforded a means
to obtain compensation for unlawful detention. Id.
16. See UNMIK Refutes Allegations of Judicial Bias and Lack of Strategy, UNMIK NEWS
(Division of Public Information, UNMIK Pristina), June 25, 2001 [hereinafter
UNMIK, Judicial Bias] (justifying U.N. use of measures such as executive detention
because of the state of emergency recognized in Kosovo), at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/news/nl98.html (on file with the American
University Law Review).
17. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Amnesty International Protests the
Unlawful Detention of Afrim Zeqiri (Feb. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Amnesty, Afrim
Zeqiri] (criticizing the SRSG’s detention of a Kosovar Albanian after Executive
Orders had expired), at http://www.amnesty.org (on file with the American
University Law Review); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002: EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA OVERVIEW (2002) (charging U.N. administrators with deviating from
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for individuals, brazen executive revocation of institutional checks
18
undermines the legitimacy of the U.N.’s work and erodes local
19
incentive to comply with international human rights standards. For
20
this and many other reasons, international organizations that
assume responsibilities of States in tumultuous times should adopt
and enforce international standards that are typically required of
21
States.
This Comment will examine existing practices of, and problems
with, international organizations taking on state functions. It
concludes that when the U.N. undertakes peace-keeping operations
that include state functions, it should abide by the corresponding
international human rights standards and institute measures for
effective enforcement.
This Comment evaluates this problem
through the example of the UNMIK SRSG’s use of Executive Orders
for prolonged detention of suspected criminals.
To provide
historical perspective, Part I will examine the role of the U.N. in
interim administrations and the lack of applicable standards. Part II
international human rights standards and due process in the name of security),
available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe.html (on file with the American
University Law Review).
18. See generally Annemarie Devereux, Conference Paper Abstract, Searching for
Clarity: A Case-Study of UNTAET’s Application of International Human Rights Norms
(advocating that U.N. missions adopt human rights reporting requirements and
measures that ensure accountability in order to thwart threats to the U.N.’s
commitment to human rights), at http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/law/hrlc/
PCconfabstracts/Devereux.doc (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American
University Law Review).
19. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 459-60 (describing the antagonism cultivated
against the interim administration when international actors conduct their duties
arbitrarily and are not held accountable); see also UNHCR/OSCE, Update on the
Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Kosovo, Report 5, Feb.–May 2000, at 20 (May 31, 2000)
(noting that the U.N. has an opportunity to be a model of human rights in its
administration of Kosovo), at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/
minorities/minrep05eng.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
20. See Simon Chesterman, The United Nations as Government: Accountability
Mechanisms for Territories Under U.N. Administration (outlining three reasons for
institutional checks on United Nations missions: (1) to prevent the use of power in a
dictatorial or fascist manner—or fascist governance; (2) to prevent the use of power
in contradiction to human rights norms—or bad governance; and (3) to prevent the
use of power in violation of the ideals which one would like to see such power used
in the future administration of the region by local actors—or “do-as-I-say-not-as-I-do
governance”), at http://www.ipacademy.org/PDF_Reports/ un_as_govt_for_web.pdf
(last visited July 26, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). These
reasons will not be addressed in this Comment.
21. See generally Theodor Meron, Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal
Strife, 78 AM. J. INT’L L. 859 (1984) (endorsing the application of humanitarian law to
the internal conflict of States); John Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR
Accountability in Post-Conflict Kosovo, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 469, 475-78 (2001) (noting that
KFOR as a whole may be held to international human rights standards because its
members are bound by the human rights obligations of their respective home
States).
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will discuss U.N. accountability. This part first explains the rise of
privileges and immunities and the response to abuses of these
powers. It then examines the legal basis for the expansion of U.N.
functions and argues that because of this expansion, human rights
law should apply to the U.N. Part III traces the U.N.’s instrumental
role in the development of human rights standards, particularly those
relating to detentions, and discusses the absence of any binding effect
of these documents on the U.N. This part also provides arguments
for the legal basis for applying human rights instruments. Part IV will
explore the administration of UNMIK as a case study on the abuse of
human rights through centralized authority. This part will also
examine the methods the U.N. has employed to correct these abuses.
Part V will discuss recommendations on how to incorporate checks
on the administration of human rights standards in U.N. missions.
Finally, Part VI will discuss the implications of applying human rights
law to the U.N.
I.

THE HISTORY OF U.N. AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION
INVOLVEMENT IN INTERIM ADMINISTRATIONS

A. The History of U.N. and International Organization Administration
For more than a century, international organizations have been
22
involved in interim territorial administrations without clear
guidance on what international human rights standards they
23
The U.N.’s
undertake when conducting affairs of States.
predecessor, the League of Nations, engaged in many forms of
24
territorial administration.
The League of Nations exercised
25
governmental function in the Free City of Danzig and limited

22. See Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timor and Beyond: The Role of International
Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 583, 583 (2001) (recounting that the U.N.
and its predecessor, the League of Nations, have been involved in the administration
of refugee camps, the operation of relief assistance programs and the conduct of
government).
23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. For activities prior to the creation of
the International Bill of Human Rights, states followed international human rights
standards that were a result of custom. Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 638.
24. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 583; see also M.S. RAJAN, THE EXPANDING
JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 35-36 (1982) (reviewing questions of
jurisdiction and sovereignty raised in the involvement of the U.N. and the League of
Nations in the administration of non-self governing territories). See generally R.C.
Longworth, End of Sovereignty: Nations’ Internal Affairs Now the World’s Business, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 19, 1993, at 1C (arguing that the U.N. has an inherent capacity to
administer territories) (emphasis added).
25. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (noting this administration continued from
1920-1939).
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26

governmental functions in the German Saar Basin, the Columbian
27
28
town and district of Leticia and in Lithuania. Following World War
29
II, Member States also authorized the U.N. to use administrative
powers over the Free Territory of Trieste, though the U.N. never
30
actually assumed this role.
In the creation of the U.N., the drafters explicitly authorized the
31
U.N.’s involvement in trusteeships, which began the Organization’s
nearly fifty-year involvement in the administration of former
32
Following its experience with trusteeships, the U.N.
colonies.
received authorization from the Security Council to begin a series of
33
territorial administrations during the Cold War era.
The U.N.
administered Irian Jaya, or western Guinea, during the transition
34
from Dutch to Indonesian control of the region. The U.N. also
35
helped administer the Congo from 1960-1964. Although authorized
to administer South West Africa, or Namibia, it did not because of
36
South African protest.
26. Id. (noting League of Nations administration of the Saar between 1920 and
1935).
27. Id. (noting League of Nations administration of Leticia from 1933-1934).
28. Id. (noting that the League of Nations appointed the president of the Upper
Silesia Mixed Commission in 1922 and the chair of the Memel Harbor Board in
Lithuania in 1924).
29. As used in this Comment, “Member States” refers to the Member States of
the U.N. A complete list of U.N. Member States is posted on the U.N. home page at
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.
30. Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (discussing the 1947 U.N. authorization to
exercise governmental powers in Trieste).
31. U.N. CHARTER ch. XII; see Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of
Post-Conflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 76 (2001). Based on the authority of Article
77 of the U.N. Charter, the League of Nations trusteeship passed to the U.N. Id.
32. See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1129 (Bruno
Simma ed., 2002) (noting that the U.N. terminated its last trusteeship in 1994 but
decided to suspend the Trusteeship Council activities rather than dissolve the
institution); see also infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (describing ways in
which the U.N. has been involved in territorial administration and trusteeships).
33. See generally RAJAN, supra note 24, at 201 (crediting the expansion of the
U.N.’s jurisdiction also to the call from peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America for
“international accountability for the welfare of colonial peoples”).
34. See Agreement Concerning West New Guinea (West Irian), Aug. 15, 1962,
Indon.-Neth., 437 U.N.T.S. 274 (establishing the administration of West New
Guinea); see also Matheson, supra note 31, at 77 (noting that Indonesia and the
Netherlands made an agreement in which they delegated to the U.N. interim control
over western Guinea for a seven-month period during 1962-1963).
35. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586; see also RAJAN, supra note 24, at 159 (outlining
the framework of an agreement between the Congo and the U.N. for the
maintenance of peace and security in the region).
36. See G.A. Res. 2248, U.N. GAOR, 5th Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/6657 (1967); see also Wilde, supra note 22, at 586; Matheson, supra note 31, at 77
(noting that the U.N. had even set up a Council for Namibia to carry out the
functions of governance). But see IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note
4 (listing a U.N. state-building mission in Namibia from 1989-1990 that worked
primarily on elections).
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After the Cold War, international organizations, predominately the
37
U.N., engaged in a second series of territorial administrations in
38
In 1991, the Security Council
response to regional conflicts.
39
40
authorized the U.N. to administer Western Sahara and Cambodia
41
With the rise of the
in an effort to promote regional stability.
conflict in the Balkans in the 1990s, the European Union became
42
involved in the administration of Mostar
while the U.N.
43
administered Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the conclusion of the
44
Bosnian war with the Dayton process, the U.N. led the
administration of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, or Eastern
45
Slavonia, all of which are located in Croatia.
The most recent U.N. missions have raised questions of what
46
obligations the U.N. assumes in the administration of territories.
Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”)

37. See Ruth E. Gordon, Some Legal Problems with Trusteeship, 28 CORNELL INT’L L. J.
301, 303-04 (1995) (arguing that the U.N.’s recent efforts at humanitarian
intervention is the modern incarnation of the trusteeship). See generally Thomas M.
Franck, United Nations Based Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 601 (1990) (discussing the role of the U.N. after the Cold War).
38. See Edward C. Luck, Book Review, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 603, 603 (2000).
39. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (acknowledging the U.N. has not yet assumed
its administrative role in Western Sahara). See generally Yahia H. Zoubir, The Western
Sahara Conflict: A Case Study in Failure of Pre-negotiation and Prolongation of Conflict, 26
CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 173, 212-13 (1996) (describing the conflict in Western Sahara and
U.N. involvement in peace negotiations).
40. See Carol Umhoefer, United Nations Towards a U.N.-Sponsored Cambodian
Solution, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 275, 277 (1991) (noting increased U.N. involvement in
Cambodia after peace negotiations failed).
41. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586.
42. See Eur. Comm’n Bulletin of the Eur. Union, Memorandum of Understanding on
the European Union Administration of Mostar (June 10, 1994) (acknowledging that the
E.U.
would
administer
Mostar,
not
the
U.N.),
available
at
http://law.gonzaga.edu/library/ceedocs/bosnia/mostar94.htm (on file with the
American University Law Review); Eur. Comm’n Bulletin of the Eur. Union, Former
Yugoslavia (Feb. 14, 1996) (pledging the European Unions’ commitment to the
Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) on its Administration of Mostar), available
at http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/9601/p104008.htm (on file with the
American University Law Review).
43. See S.C. Res. 1035, SCOR 50th Sess., 3613 mtg. S/RES/1035
(1995)(establishing U.N. administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina); see also S.C.
Res. 1088, SCOR 51st Sess., 3723 mtg. S/RES/1088 (1996) (extending the mandate
for U.N. administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina). The mission terminated on
Dec. 31, 2002. For more information on the U.N. mission in Bosnia, visit the home
page of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (“UNMIBH”), at
http://www.unmibh.org/index.asp.
44. See generally SUMANTRA BOSE, BOSNIA AFTER DAYTON: NATIONALIST PARTITION
AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION 1-4 (2002) (criticizing the Dayton Peace
Agreement that ended the Bosnian war and effectively divided the region into three
states).
45. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586 (noting U.N. administration from 1996-98).
46. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing issues of U.N.
accountability in interim administrations thus far raised in legal scholarship).
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47

bombing of the disintegrating former Yugoslavia, the U.N. began
48
administering Kosovo. Three months later, the U.N. also assumed
the administration of East Timor under a similarly worded Security
49
Council mandate. These recent missions were unique in that they
included
substantial
civil
administration,
including
the
administration of justice and the rule of law, a role the U.N.
50
undertook for the first time in such a holistic form. Until these later
missions, detention issues had not arisen as a matter of human rights
51
law for the U.N. Thus, while the present review of international
organization involvement in territorial administration is by no means
exhaustive, it highlights the breadth of U.N. and international
organization involvement in territorial administration. Although the
U.N. has increasingly expanded its administrative powers in territorial
52
administrations to include more than just executive authority, there
53
has been little or no discussion of detentions until recent missions.

47. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (authorizing the interim
administration in Kosovo).
48. See TIM JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE (2000). Following Slobodan
Milosevic’s unwillingness to negotiate an agreement to curb the violations of human
rights and the failure of Rambouillet talks, the United States led a campaign to end
Serb aggression. Id. at 197-226. The events concluded with the passage of Security
Council Resolution 1244, authorizing the U.N. administration of Kosovo. Id. at 297.
49. See U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (authorizing the administration of
East Timor).
50. See REFORMING THE UNITED NATIONS: THE QUIET REVOLUTION 866 (Joachim
Muller ed., 2001) (noting that UNMIK was the first mission where the U.N. assumed
almost complete administrative responsibilities of a state ranging from establishing
customs to collecting garbage). The author notes that prior to UNMIK and
UNTAET, the U.N. had only engaged in “elements of civil administration.” Id. at
866. See IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 4 (cataloguing the types
of powers the U.N. assumed in its state-building missions).
51. See Bulletin on the Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/1999/13, § 1.1 (1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M.
1656, 1658 (1999) [hereinafter Bulletin] (outlining provisions for the treatment of
civilians, combatants, and detainees in accordance with the Third Geneva
Convention of 1949). The Bulletin notes that provisions regarding U.N. observation
of humanitarian law are applicable in situations of armed conflict or when peacekeepers engage in use of force as self defense. But see Peter Finn, U.S. Troops Seize 6
Terror Suspects Freed by Bosnia, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2002, at A16 (noting that issues of
unlawful detention also arose in the context of international peace-keepers’ defiance
of orders from a Bosnian court to release six individuals, five of whom had
naturalized Bosnian citizenship). U.S. officials arrested the men after the Bosnian
government released them. Id. They were eventually transferred to detention
facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Id.
52. IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 4.
53. See Bulletin, supra note 51, § 1.1 (outlining provisions for the treatment of
detainees).
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B. The Lack of Norms for Laws Applicable in Administration
Although the U.N.’s role in territorial administration has been
extensive, the legal standard it should observe in these situations is
54
not as clear. The purposes listed in the U.N. Charter serve as an
55
overarching standard but are only principles without binding
56
authority. Since the U.N. typically intervenes in situations of gross
violations of human rights, it often uses exigency as justification for
57
deviation from human rights norms. As a result, the nature of the
intervention usurps discussion on the standards by which the U.N.
58
should abide.
U.N. derogation from human rights is viewed as
59
subsidiary to the atrocities committed by the existing government,
60
and media attention reinforces such a notion.
Additionally, as
“interim” signifies, the U.N. considers its presence temporary, so it
61
places emphasis on intervention rather than accountability. In the
rare instances where there are discussions of accountability, they are
62
framed in terms of protecting international personnel.
54. See Devereux, supra note 18 (urging the U.N. to establish human rights
monitoring and reporting systems and to increase its accountability in the field
compatible with its privileges and immunities).
55. See infra notes 143-51 and accompanying text (describing the purposes of the
U.N.).
56. See N.D. WHITE, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS 225 (1996)
(noting that the language in the Preamble and Article 1(3) of the U.N. Charter
merely promotes “increased respect” for human rights). But see Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679, 691-92 (entered into force Jan. 8, 1980) (“A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”).
57. See, e.g., UNMIK, Judicial Bias, supra note 16 (justifying the U.N.’s use of
executive orders based on the continued state of emergency in Kosovo).
58. See id. (responding to accusations of violations of international human rights
standards by stating that “Kosovo still ranks as an internationally-recognized
emergency,” even though the mission at this point had been existent for nearly two
years). The article further noted that “international human rights standards accept
the need for special measures that, in the wider interests of security, and under
prescribed legal conditions, allow authorities to respond to the finding of
intelligence that are not able to be presented to the court system.” Id. See generally
KELLY-KATE S. PEASE, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNANCE
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 212-16 (2d ed. 2000) (equating humanitarian
intervention with a form of “dictatorial interference” with the affairs of a sovereign
State).
59. See, e.g., OSCE, KOSOVO/KOSOVA: AS SEEN, AS TOLD (1999) (reviewing the
OSCE-Kosovo Verification Mission’s documentation of human rights abuses
committed by the Serb regime in the year prior to NATO Bombing).
60. See, e.g., Guy Dinmore, Atrocity Probes Begin as Serbs Pull Out, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 1,
1998, at N8 (focusing on Western diplomats plans to examine accusations of Serbian
atrocities against ethnic Albanians and possible atrocities committed by ethnic
Albanians).
61. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 458.
62. See, e.g., Walter Gary Sharp, Sr., Protecting the Avatars of International Peace and
Security, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 93, 96 (1996)(discussing protection of military
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Recent missions have been more conscious of human rights
63
standards. In an address at Harvard, Secretary-General Kofi Annan
acknowledged his commitment to promoting human rights in U.N.
64
work. These values have translated into the language of Security
65
Council resolutions. For example, the authorization for UNMIK
includes broad statements of protecting and promoting human
66
rights.
The authorization of the United Nations Transitional
Administration in East Timor (“UNTAET”) was more specific with a
list of enumerated human rights standards by which U.N. personnel
67
were bound. Despite the broad pledges to observe human rights,
68
the specific method to implement these guidelines remains unclear,
particularly when coupled with the use of centralized power in
administering these territories and the grant of blanket immunities to
U.N. personnel. Thus, the lack of guidelines, in addition to the
lingering tolerance for U.N. derogation from human rights and
interim mindset, makes it difficult to curb improper U.N. policies,
69
particularly in areas like unlawful detentions.
II. OBLIGATIONS FOLLOWING FUNCTIONS: HOLDING THE U.N.
ACCOUNTABLE TO INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS THAT ARE REQUIRED
OF STATES
Despite the lack of clarity surrounding human rights
implementation, the goal of achieving U.N. accountability remains
unchanged and can be justified in several ways. Member States have
recognized that the U.N. has the capacities of a State, including that
personnel serving the international community); see infra Part II.A (discussing
reactions to abuses of privileges and immunities).
63. See U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (including a list of human rights
conventions that the mission planned to observe).
64. Kofi A. Annan, Strengthening United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights:
Prospects and Priorities, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6 (1997) (committing the U.N. to
respecting human rights law as it is intimately related to long-lasting peace and
sustainable development).
65. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (including in the responsibilities of
the international civilian presence “protecting and promoting human rights”); see
also U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (listing the human rights conventions
applicable to the mission).
66. U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12, at 11(j). But see supra note 9 (noting
UNMIK’s adoption of international human rights standards through regulation
1999/24, rather than Security Council resolution).
67. See UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, supra note 9.
68. Annan, supra note 64, at 6 (acknowledging that “[h]uman rights
considerations need to be integrated fully in all our approaches and activities, and in
all our policy-making and programs, both at Headquarters and in the field,” but not
clarifying how such goals should be achieved).
69. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 677 (arguing that the lack of articulated
standards of human rights creates a gap in accountability).
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of privileges and immunities and the ability to claim reparations for
70
its agents. While the U.N.’s functions have expanded, the U.N. has
not undertaken the reciprocal obligations that would be required of a
71
State. This section reviews the grant of privileges and immunities to
the U.N. and the ability of the U.N. to claim reparations, concluding
72
that the U.N.’s obligations should parallel the rights afforded to it.
A. Privileges Afforded to International Organizations: The Privilege of
Immunities
The U.N.’s exercise of privileges and immunities without
comparable obligations demonstrates the inequity of applying
73
standards based on status, rather than function. Although the U.N.
74
is not beholden to the same human rights standards as States, it
75
enjoys many of the benefits given to States, such as privileges and
76
immunities. Recently, some non-governmental organizations have
taken steps to curtail the application of privileges and immunities by
applying humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops so that functions
77
and obligations may more equally match. Still, it remains unclear
how the competing obligations of privileges and immunities and
78
humanitarian law operate together.
While the application of
70. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing privileges and immunities and the
international legal personality of international organizations).
71. See FINN SEYERSTED, UNITED NATIONS FORCES: IN THE LAW OF PEACE AND WAR
392 (1966) (describing the U.N.’s limited adoption of the humanitarian law
obligations that would be required of States); see also infra note 94 and accompanying
text.
72. See infra Part II.B (describing the rights the U.N. as an international
organization has acquired in conducting its functions).
73. See Rawski, supra note 1, at 125 (arguing that the recognition of immunities
in U.N. interim administrations at times may contradict the mission’s commitment to
human rights standards).
74. See supra note 8 (noting that the U.N. has not consented to humanitarian law
or human rights law).
75. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 179 (April 11) [hereinafter Reparation Case]. As a part of its recognition of
personality, the I.C.J. noted that the U.N. has been able to conclude treaties, to make
claims on behalf of its agents, and to engage in activities for the fulfillment of its
purposes. Id.
76. See Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, art.
3, sec. 9, Feb. 13, 1946, § 2, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1422, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, 20 [hereinafter
Convention on Privileges and Immunities] (recognizing that official U.N.
communications are of equivalent status as those of state diplomatic missions and are
therefore afforded equally favorable treatment); U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1)
(requiring Member States to recognize U.N. privileges and immunities). But see
RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 223, cmt. b (stating that international organizations
“do not generally enjoy diplomatic immunity.”).
77. See generally SEYERSTED, supra note 71 (describing early attempts by the
International Red Cross to persuade the U.N. to observe international humanitarian
standards under the Geneva Conventions).
78. See OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law,
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humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops is an important first step,
the U.N. has not made similar international human rights standards
79
The presence of these
applicable to its non-military personnel.
privileges without reciprocal obligations again underlines the
80
inequity of the U.N.’s privileged status.
Member States have acknowledged that privileges and immunities
should be granted to international organizations because the drafters
81
of the U.N. Charter endowed the U.N. with such an authorization.
In Article 105, the U.N. Charter recognizes that the Organization
“shall enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and
82
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes.”
Such privileges are commonly formalized through additional
83
agreements.
With its Member States, the U.N. formalized these
guidelines in the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the
84
Among other privileges, the treaty gave U.N.
United Nations.
officials immunity from legal process and exemption from tax and
85
duty charges. In present-day missions, the U.N. often concludes
agreements with States to provide similar forms of privileges and
86
immunities particular to the situation.
After reports of abuses, the U.N. moved to curb privileges and
immunities afforded to peace-keeping troops through the adaptation
87
of humanitarian law to its peace-keeping operations. Questions of
Review of the Criminal Justice System: February 2000–July 2000, 1, 16-17 [hereinafter
OSCE, LSMR 1] (observing that the Ombudsperson may provide guidance on the
compatibility of international law with domestic laws in Kosovo, but it is unclear
whether this guidance will be treated as binding on the Kosovo courts), available at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ criminal_justice.pdf (last
visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
79. See supra note 8 (noting that the U.N. has not formally consented to the
application of human rights or humanitarian law standards to its operations).
80. See Rawski, supra note 1, and accompanying text.
81. U.N. CHARTER art. 105(1).
82. Id.
83. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 467, cmt. f (citing the Headquarters
agreement and the International Organizations Immunities Act as supplementary
sources of privileges and immunities for the U.N.).
84. Convention on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 76, at pmbl.; see United
Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the United Nations
Secretary-General (listing 146 countries as parties to the Convention, which was first
adopted in 1946 and entered into force at the end of that year), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIII/tre
aty1.asp (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
85. Convention on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 76, at sec. 18.
86. See generally Convention on Privileges and Immunities, supra note 76
(stipulating that Member States afford certain privileges and immunities to the
U.N.). But see, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, supra note 12 (declaring unilaterally
that the UNMIK and KFOR will be afforded privileges and immunities without the
consent of the host state, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
87. See Daphna Shraga, U.N. Peacekeeping Operations: Applicability of International
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the abuse of privileges and immunities arose in the 1990s when the
post-Cold War climate created regional power struggles that
88
After
ultimately demanded international military intervention.
89
reports of U.N. peace-keeping troops committing abuses in Rwanda,
90
91
Mozambique, and Somalia, the U.N. was forced to look at the
92
mechanisms to hold international peace-keepers accountable. The
International Committee for the Red Cross (“ICRC”) led the way with
93
a meeting to discuss U.N. accountability.
The conference
attendants helped draft a report that formed the foundation of the
Secretary-General’s Bulletin on the Observation by United Nations
94
Forces of International Humanitarian Law (“Bulletin”).
The
document enumerated the specific provisions of international
Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-Related Damage, 94 AM. J. INT’L L.
406, 407-09 (2000) (observing the changing role of peace-keeping operations and
the need for legally binding standards of accountability to match these
developments); see also Bulletin, supra note 51 (enumerating the fundamental
principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations
forces).
88. See generally Kelly Childers, Note, United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Balkan
Wars and the Changing Role of Peacekeeping Forces in the Post-Cold War World, 8 TEMP.
INT’L & COMP. L.J. 117 (1994) (crediting the end of the Cold War to the increase in
the number of complex peacekeeping missions deployed under the auspices of the
U.N.).
89. See Jennifer Gould, Peacekeeping Atrocities: U.N. Soldiers Accused of Torture,
Murder, Sexual Exploitation of Children, VILLAGE VOICE, June 24, 1997, 1997 WL
11416180 (reporting that “[i]n Rwanda, in addition to ‘mismanaging’ $26 million,
U.N. peacekeepers were accused of smuggling, sexual exploitation of women and
children and criminal abuse of diplomatic immunity”).
90. See id. (reporting that U.N. troops in Mozambique were accused of sexually
exploiting women and children).
91. See id. (noting that two Belgian soldiers were to stand trial for “roasting” a
Somali child on an open fire during a U.N. peace-keeping mission in 1993).
Another Belgian soldier will face prosecution “for forcing a Somali child to drink salt
water, vomit, and worms.” Id.; see Raf Casert, U.N. Peacekeepers Accused of Atrocities
During Somalia Mission, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., June 24, 1997, 1997 WL 4547124 (noting
that Italian peacekeepers allegedly raped Somali women and that “Canadian
peacekeepers beat a Somali teenager to death and shot other civilians unprovoked”);
see also Peacekeepers’ Atrocities in Somalia Stir Outrage, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June
24, 1997, at A2, 1997 WL 3199705 (stating that the U.N. Secretary-General expressed
outraged at the atrocities of U.N. peace-keeping troops from Canada, Italy and
Belgium). See generally Rawski, supra note 1, at n.6 (summarizing instances where the
U.N. should be held accountable in its field work).
92. See Shraga, supra note 87, at 406 (exploring the development of the
guidelines for applying international humanitarian law to U.N. peace-keeping
operations).
93. Id. at 407. See generally SEYERSTED, supra note 71 (describing early attempts by
the International Committee for the Red Cross to persuade the U.N. to observe
international humanitarian standards under the Geneva Conventions). While the
U.N. assured the ICRC that its forces would comply with the spirit of the agreements,
the U.N. did not make further arrangements to be bound by these conventions. Id.
The U.N. argued that, though it was not a signatory, Member States were parties and
could determine how to apply the laws to their contingents. Id. at 393.
94. Bulletin, supra note 51, at art. 6.1-6.3.
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humanitarian law that the U.N. would respect, including prohibition
95
of certain forms of combat and weapons, prohibition of certain
96
97
orders, proper treatment of civilians and persons, and protection
98
of the wounded, the sick, and medical and relief personnel. The
agreement also included specific provisions on the treatment of
detained persons, specifying how the U.N. should treat prisoners of
war and detailing, among other things, that prisoners of war should
receive sanitary housing, food and medical attention and remain free
99
from torture. While extensive, these agreements do not include
100
complete observation of human rights standards and are limited to
101
the peace-keeping personnel engaged in armed conflict.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 6.5.
97. Id. art. 7.
98. Id. art. 9.
99. Id. art. 8. The Bulletin provides that:
The United Nations force shall treat with humanity and respect for their
dignity detained members of the armed forces and other persons who no
longer take part in military operations by reason of detention. Without
prejudice to their legal status, they shall be treated in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, as may be
applicable to them mutatis mutandis. In particular:
(a) Their capture and detention shall be notified without delay to the party
on which they depend and to the Central Tracing Agency of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in particular in order to
inform their families;
(b) They shall be held in secure and safe premises which provide all possible
safeguards of hygiene and health, and shall not be detained in areas exposed
to the dangers of the combat zone;
(c) They shall be entitled to receive food and clothing, hygiene and medical
attention;
(d) They shall under no circumstances be subjected to any form of torture
or ill-treatment;
(e) Women whose liberty has been restricted shall be held in quarters
separate from men’s quarters, and shall be under the immediate supervision
of women;
(f) In cases where children who have not attained the age of sixteen years
take a direct part in hostilities and are arrested, detained or interned by the
United Nations force, they shall continue to benefit from special protection.
In particular, they shall be held in quarters separate from the quarters of
adults, except when accommodated with their families;
(g) ICRC’s right to visit prisoners and detained persons shall be respected
and guaranteed.
Id.
100. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 745 (7th ed. 1999) (defining humanitarian law as
including the “law dealing with such matters as the use of weapons and other means
of warfare, the treatment of war victims by the enemy, and generally the direct
impact of war on human life and liberty”). It also defines human rights law as “the
freedoms, immunities and benefits that, according to modern values (especially at
the international level), all human beings should be able to claim as a matter of right
in the society in which they live.” Id. Since U.N. interim administrations are typically
post-conflict, humanitarian law is not applicable in a U.N. civil society development
mission such as UNMIK or UNTAET. It is unclear whether human rights law is
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The application of codified and customary international
humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops has raised questions of
enforcement and competing obligations under privileges and
102
immunities treaties.
As Member States have preferred to serve as
103
proxies for the attachment of responsibility for their nationals,
there has been limited success in pursuing violations, unless the
104
conduct is exceedingly egregious.
States are unlikely to prosecute
105
Thus, unlawful
unless the U.N. provides other institutional checks.
conduct may continue with impunity without U.N. involvement or
106
media attention.
In effect, while the international humanitarian
law applicable to a State is now applied to U.N. peace-keeping
107
Furthermore, it
missions, a gap of effective enforcement remains.
is unclear how obligations under the Bulletin comport with blanket
privileges and immunities granted to U.N. personnel on its
108
missions.
legally applicable since the typical vehicle would be the State rather than the U.N.
101. Bulletin, supra note 51, at pmbl., § 1.1 (applying “fundamental principles and
rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces when in
situations of armed conflict”).
102. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 650 (observing that while the U.N. promotes
the integration of “human rights components” into peace-keeping operations, it does
not empower these components with judicial or enforcement action when they
discover violations). But see Shraga, supra note 87, at 412 (arguing that even though
international humanitarian law was not applicable to peace-keeping troops, the U.N.
“implicitly assumed” and “practically implemented” these standards long before their
formal recognition).
103. See Bulletin, supra note 51, § 4 (reserving prosecution of members of U.N.
military personnel to their respective national courts).
104. See Stephen Bates, Troops Cleared on Child Roasting, THE GUARDIAN, July 1,
1997, 1997 WL 2389469 (reporting that a Belgian court had acquitted the two U.N.
peace-keepers whose photo was taken with a child roasting over a fire). The article
noted that the decision was unexpected. Id. It also reported that nine other
paratroopers had been acquitted of abusing civilians. Id.; see supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
105. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTE OF KOSOVO, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT 2000–2001
(2001) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTE OF KOSOVO, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT]
(tabulating sixty-two complaints filed with the Ombudsperson’s office against KFOR,
forty-six on which the Ombudsperson could not take action because of the limited
nature of his mandate), available at http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/
annual%20report2000_2001.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American
University Law Review). It is unclear whether any action has been taken on these
cases.
106. See generally supra note 91 (noting Belgium’s move toward prosecution of
peace-keepers after allegations of misconduct but eventual acquittal of these
charges).
107. See Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 648-49 (criticizing the narrowing of
international humanitarian obligations under the Bulletin to only certain provisions
and the limitation of liability of third party claims that may be incurred by peacekeeping troops).
108. OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, ON THE
COMPATIBILITY WITH RECOGNIZED INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OF UNMIK REGULATION
NO. 2000/47 ON THE STATUS, PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF KFOR AND UNMIK AND
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While criticism persists, the recognition of the applicability of
humanitarian law to U.N. military operations is an important first
step to diluting the artificial legal boundary between an international
organization and a State when the fundamental question revolves
109
around the function performed. The deployment of troops under
the umbrella of an international organization does not make a long
110
tradition of humanitarian law inapplicable. The U.N.’s adoption of
principles of humanitarian law embodied in the Bulletin is an
important step in tailoring an entire body of law to the
111
Organization.
However, given that humanitarian law is
inapplicable in post-war settings, the U.N. should take a similar step
in applying human rights law to its personnel in interim
112
administrations.
B. The Reparation Case: The Recognition of International Organizations
As Having International Legal Personality
In addition to privileges of immunity, the U.N. has also been
recognized as possessing another characteristic traditionally afforded
113
to States—international legal personality.
Such a capacity allows
114
the U.N. to take on duties once exclusively reserved to States.
THEIR PERSONNEL IN KOSOVO AND ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ABOVE REGULATION
¶ 82 (2000) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1] (concluding that
UNMIK and KFOR privileges and immunities were incompatible with international
standards),
at
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20
reps/pdf/sr1.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
109. But see Major Joseph P. “Dutch” Bialke, United Nations Peace Operations:
Applicable Norms and the Application of the Law of Armed Conflict, 50 A.F. L. REV. 1, 57-58
(2001) (criticizing the promulgation of the Bulletin as providing a “one-size-fits-all”
approach to applying humanitarian law to peace-keeping troops and advocating the
adaptation of such law to the type of operation being executed).
110. See supra note 91 and accompanying text. The newspaper articles cited
indicate that the U.N. peace-keeping soldiers were tried in their home States. In
cases of egregious conduct, the norm is for individual States to try their soldiers in
the soldier’s home States.
Traditionally, a combination of international
humanitarian law and domestic law, therefore, are applied to members of an
international brigade.
111. See Bulletin, supra note 51, § 2 (adopting a non-exhaustive list of principles
and rules of international humanitarian law upon military personnel). But see
Julianne Peck, The U.N. and the Laws of War: How Can the World’s Peacekeepers Be Held
Accountable?, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 283, 309-10 (1995) (advocating that the
U.N. accede to the Hague and Geneva Conventions to ensure that the Organization
is held to the same standard as States in conduct during warfare).
112. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2002, supra note 17 (criticizing
UNMIK for not meeting international human rights standards); see also
OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, supra note 108, ¶ 84 (recommending the
imposition of limits on UNMIK and KFOR immunity).
113. See THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 390 (Christopher C. Joyner
ed., 1997)(noting that the I.C.J. acknowledged the legal personality of an
international organization, a status typically reserved to States).
114. See generally A.S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR HOST
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Although the notion of functional necessity has been advantageous to
expanding the U.N.’s role, it has not been coupled with reciprocal
115
The following section reviews Reparation for Injuries
obligations.
116
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations (“Reparation Case”) and
argues its approach as the foundation for asserting obligations upon
117
the U.N. based on the functions it undertakes.
A review of the Reparation Case
The seminal Reparation Case has provided the legal basis allowing
international organizations to take on roles traditionally afforded to
118
States. In the case, the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”) held
that the U.N. had legal personality based on the notion of functional
119
necessity. The court noted that organizations such as the U.N. had
120
capacity similar to a State.
Member States had endowed the U.N.
with certain duties and responsibilities so that the U.N. would be
“exercising and enjoying functions and rights which can only be
explained on the basis of the possession of a large measure of
international personality and the capacity to operate upon an
121
Emerging from the I.C.J.’s language was the
international plane.”
theory of functional necessity, which implied that the U.N. did in fact
have some degree of international legal personality, though this
122
personality did not rise to the level of a State. Although not explicit
in the Reparation Case, the I.C.J. clarified in a subsequent opinion that
1.

STATES: ASPECTS OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 72 (1995) (finding that, although the
U.N.’s charter does not mention legal personality, in a survey of constituent
instruments of international organizations, few had provisions explicitly granting
international legal personality to the organization).
115. Id. at 172. But see Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 643-44 (interpreting the
possession of “duties” as the legal equivalent to obliging the U.N. to international
human rights standards).
116. Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179.
117. While functional necessity is a term of art associated with the Reparations
Case’s discussion of privileges and immunities, it is a useful term in discussing how
rights and obligations should follow each other in the law of international
organizations.
118. See HENRY G. SCHERMERS & NIELS M. BLOKKER, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL
LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY § 1563 (3d rev. ed. 1995) (noting that during the
twentieth century there was a growing recognition of international organizations
having legal personality separate from its Member States and stating that scholars
have generally accepted this view); see also Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179
(arguing that the U.N. is an international person with corresponding international
rights and duties).
119. Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179; see U.N. CHARTER art. 104
(acknowledging that the U.N. has “legal capacity” in the territory of a Member State
to exercise its functions and to fulfill its purposes).
120. Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 175.
121. Id. at 179.
122. Id.
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the U.N. should interpret functional necessity broadly.
The
recognition of functional necessity as the basis for U.N. capacity has
allowed for significant expansion of the roles which the U.N. may
undertake—so much so that the U.N. arguably behaves as a State
124
more so than an international organization.
2.

The problem with a function-based approach to grants of power for
international organizations
While the Reparation Case has allowed for significant expansion of
125
U.N. powers, it has also created an inconsistent standard for the law
126
applicable to international organizations.
Based on the notion of
functional necessity, an international organization may exercise the
127
Some of these functions, such as
powers implied in its purposes.
the interim administration of a region, mirror the functions of a
128
State.
Yet, since the international organization is not a State, it is
not legally obligated to abide by the treaties and conventions to
129
which States are signatories.
The problems inherent in this
approach are similar to those presented by the granting of privileges
130
and immunities. Impunity prevails until tragedy spurs the U.N. to
131
reform its notion of accountability.
Similarly, in interim
administrations, the U.N. has been delinquent in formally
123. See generally MULLER, supra note 114, at 53 (clarifying that in the Mazilu
Advisory Opinion, the I.C.J. rejected a restrictive interpretation of functional
necessity). It must be noted, however, that the Mazilu case dealt with the issue of
functional necessity in the context of privileges and immunities of U.N. personnel.
124. Id. But see Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179 (arguing that the U.N. should
be governed by international law because it has international rights and duties).
125. See MULLER, supra note 114, at 34-35 (interpreting the I.C.J.’s Certain Expenses
of the United Nations as allowing the U.N. to exercise a wide array of powers); see also
MAGDALENA M. MARTIN MARTINEZ, NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS 77-78 (1996) (concluding that an international organization’s
constituent instruments are not typically interpreted restrictively because a narrow
interpretation may styme the development of the international organization’s future
activities).
126. See supra note 8; see, e.g., infra note 200 (limiting signatories to human rights
conventions to States though the U.N. had begun expanding its role to include state
functions that would require analogous duties to a State).
127. See Manuel Rama-Montaldo, International Legal Personality and Implied Powers of
International Organizations, 1971 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 111, 147-49 (1971) (noting that
the I.C.J. upheld the legality of the U.N.’s actions based on the function and purpose
of the organization).
128. See SEYERSTED, supra note 71 (noting that jurisdiction over territories is one of
the powers the U.N. possesses that is similar to a State).
129. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra
note 118, § 1573 (noting that the U.N. is not a party to many of the human rights
conventions and that it is not bound because it has not manifested consent).
130. See supra Part II.A (discussing privileges and immunities).
131. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text (describing the abuses
committed by the U.N. peace-keeping troops before the organization adopted some
standards of international humanitarian law).
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acknowledging which standards apply to these missions, despite its
132
The functional
long involvement in interim administrations.
necessity approach therefore creates a loophole where international
organizations are not held to the same standards as States performing
133
the same tasks.
Despite the Reparation Case’s acknowledgement of
134
“duties,” without formal consent to, and enforcement of, these
135
obligations, the U.N.’s actions remain unchecked.
One suggestion to correct for the lacuna created in a functional
approach is to begin to tear down the artificial separation between
136
international organizations and States.
While international
organizations do not possess the traditional characteristics of a State,
they have begun to adopt functions once exclusively reserved to
137
States.
Privileges, immunities, reparations and territorial
administration are all powers once exclusively considered within the
138
domain of a State. Thus, in the case of interim administrations, the
U.N. should be expected to abide by the human rights obligations of
139
a State.
Such an approach dilutes the distinction between States
and international organizations and emphasizes capacity exercised by
an organization, rather than its official status.
III. THE U.N. SHOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THE HUMAN
RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IT HELPED CREATE
140

Because of these expanding functions, the U.N. should be held
accountable to the human rights standards it helped create and
132. See supra Part I.A.
133. See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the application by the of the functional
necessity standard to the U.N. in the Reparation Case).
134. See Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179.
135. See supra note 69.
136. See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 696 (5th
ed. 1998) (noting that the duties of an international organization should be
correlated to reciprocal responsibilities).
137. See SEYERSTED, supra note 71, at 402 (enumerating the capacities enjoyed by
intergovernmental organizations that mirror the acts of sovereign States). Seyersted
notes that the U.N., much like States, exercises functions not authorized anywhere in
its constituent instrument, so that the only functions it does not exercise are those
that it has not yet had a reason to exercise. Id. But see RESTATEMENT, supra note 10,
§ 223, cmt. a (differentiating international organizations from States in that States
exercise power of implied statehood and state sovereignty, whereas international
organizations generally do not).
138. See supra note 137 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note
10, § 223(a) (including in the capacities of a State its status as legal person and its
ability to acquire and transfer property, to make contracts and treaties, and to pursue
remedies under such agreements).
139. See generally RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 223 (recognizing that the U.N. has
“duties created by international law” without clarifying whether such obligations
would ever extend to human rights obligations).
140. See IPA, Transitional Administrations Chart, supra note 4.
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universalize, even though it is not a signatory to these conventions.
Although there has been some acknowledgement of U.N.
accountability to humanitarian law, the U.N. has been slow to take
142
similar steps in applying human rights standards to its missions.
The following section outlines ways in which the U.N. has asserted its
interest in human rights through its Charter and through its
involvement in the creation of human rights instruments. It then
discusses the creation of regional human rights instruments that
developed out of these international standards. It also highlights the
legal framework these instruments have created for dealing with
unlawful detentions. This section concludes that these instruments
should apply to the U.N. because they represent principles which the
U.N. has committed to follow in its charter. Some of these norms
have reached a level of customary international law, and these
instruments contain rights afforded to individuals, for which the U.N.
is an intermediary.
A. The U.N.’s Commitment to Human Rights Through Its Charter and
Sponsorship of International Human Rights Standards
The U.N. Charter repeatedly states the U.N.’s commitment to
143
human rights and social justice. In several provisions, the Charter
reiterates the need for awareness and respect for human rights. In its
preamble, the U.N. Charter clarifies that part of its purpose is “to
144
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and “to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law can be
145
maintained.”
To achieve these ends, the peoples of the U.N. aim
“to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as
141. See infra note 188 (recognizing human rights conventions permit only State
Parties to be signatories).
See generally Bongiorno, supra note 1, at 692
(demonstrating that the U.N. undertakes international human rights obligations
when it behaves as a State).
142. Compare U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (including a broad commitment
to human rights standards), with U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (enumerating
the human rights conventions the mission deems applicable to its work, a notion
absent in earlier U.N. missions). See generally Mark Gibney et al., Transnational State
Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 267, 267 (1999)
(noting the contradiction in human rights law in that it is considered universal but
largely applied by States in their own territories).
143. IAN BROWNLIE, BASIC DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (3d ed. 1992). See
generally GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS 2001-2002 157-59
(outlining the ways in which the U.N. has been involved in human rights). The
current Secretary-General of the U.N., Kofi Annan, has emphasized the importance
of punishing those who abuse human rights. Id. at 157.
144. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
145. Id.
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good neighbours.”
While the contents of the preamble are not
147
binding, they do provide context to the purposes of the U.N.
The articles of the U.N. Charter build upon the notion of U.N.
interest in human rights. In Article 1, the U.N. acknowledges its
purpose of maintaining international peace and security by bringing
about “by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of
justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of
148
the peace.” The U.N. reiterates its commitment to human rights by
noting as a purpose the achievement of “international co-operation
in solving international problems of [a] . . . humanitarian character”
and in “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
149
fundamental freedoms.” The theme of promotion of human rights
150
is affirmed again and again in the U.N. Charter, underscoring the
151
facilitative role that the U.N. plays in the formation of these ideals.
These values, however, have not created legally binding obligations.
In the end, such language remains an idealistic goal.
As an institution, the U.N. has been active in the promotion and
152
codification of human rights.
Under its auspices, the U.N.
developed the three major documents that form the International
Bill of Human Rights: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

146. Id.
147. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 56, art. 31 (setting
out broad rules for the interpretation of treaties).
148. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(1).
149. Id. art. 1(3).
150. See, e.g., id. arts. 55(c), 62(2), 68 (noting under the chapter for international
economic and social cooperation that the U.N. must promote “universal respect for,
and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”). Article 62(2) states that one of the
functions and powers of the Economic and Social Council is that “[i]t may make
recommendations for the purpose of promoting respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.” Article 68 proclaims that “the
Economic and Social Council shall set up commissions in economic and social fields
and for the promotion of human rights, and such other commissions as may be
required for the performance of its functions.” See BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 1
(noting the emphasis that the drafters of the U.N. Charter placed on the issue of
human rights).
151. See U.N. CHARTER art. 13 (stating the General Assembly’s responsibility to
promote cooperation between countries in the areas of politics, economics, culture,
education, health, and human rights).
152. See BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 1 (naming bodies within the U.N. which set
international standards in the area of human rights, as well as emphasizing the
U.N.’s effort in composing “legal instruments containing detailed provisions”). See
generally CHRISTOF HENS & FRANS VILJOEN, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES ON THE DOMESTIC LEVEL 5 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2002) (observing that
U.N. treaties have molded modern concepts of basic human rights and the
limitations of those rights).

ABRAHAM.AUTHORCHANGES2FINAL.DOC

2003]

THE SINS OF THE SAVIOR

10/28/2003 2:07 PM

1315

153

(“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
154
(“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social
155
The drafters of the UDHR saw
and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).
the document as a standard of “common understanding” that would
156
aid in the “full realization of this pledge.” The UDHR was to serve
157
More
as a bridge between international peace and human rights.
than fifty years later, scholars view the fundamental rights
158
enumerated in the UDHR as customary international law and thus
159
As of
perceive the document as having binding effect on States.
August 2002, an overwhelming majority of States had become
160
signatories to the ICCPR and the ICESCR.
The broad
161
dissemination of the UDHR and the near universal adoption of the
153. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/811 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
154. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]
(recognizing basic human rights and freedoms, such as the right of self
determination and striving to protect those rights and freedoms from suppression).
155. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
ICESCR]. See generally United Nations High Commission on Human Rights, Fact Sheet
No. 2 (Rev.1), The International Bill of Human Rights 1, 2 (describing the process of
preparation and adoption of the ICCPR and the ICESCR and the reasons for
similarities between the two documents), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/
menu6/2/fs2.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University
Law Review). The major point of divergence from the ICCPR is that the ICESCR
enumerates more specific rights of workers such as the right to work, the right to
social security, the right to food, clothing, and housing, and the right to an
education. Id. arts. 6, 9, 11, 13. The convention puts the onus upon State Parties to
the covenant to take “international action for the achievement of the rights
recognized in the present Covenant.” Id. art. 23. The convention names the ways in
which the states may promote the rights enumerated in the covenant, such as “the
conclusion of conventions,” and “the adoption of recommendations.” Id.
156. UDHR, supra note 153, pmbl. See generally PEASE, supra note 58, at 237
(acknowledging that the UDHR, though not legally binding, “serves as an
authoritative guide to interpretation of the U.N. Charter and represents the sense of
the international community”).
157. See PEASE, supra note 58, at 237.
158. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 575 (commenting on the influence of the
UDHR); see also Elsa Stamatopoulou, The Development of United Nations Mechanisms for
the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 687 (1998)
(crediting the U.N. with the development of human rights laws and noting the
worldwide increase of “pro-human rights movements” in the years after the adoption
of the UDHR).
159. See generally BROWNLIE, supra note 143, at 21 (commenting on the UHDR’s
“considerable indirect legal effect”).
160. See Office of Human Commissioner of Human Rights, Status of Ratification of
the Principle Human Rights Treaties (2003) (listing 149 states as parties to ICCPR and
146 states as parties to ICESCR as of May 2003), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
161. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is the Most Universal Document in the World (noting that the
Guinness Book of World Records recognized the UDHR as the most widely
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two other documents are a testament to the recognition of the three
162
documents as a basis for international human rights standards.
Other intergovernmental organizations have adopted regional
standards of human rights to supplement those outlined in
163
international covenants. Using the broad support of the UDHR as
a foundation, European nations sponsored the drafting of the
164
European Convention of Human Rights (“ECHR”), which further
165
The Convention
specified human rights obligations of States.
attempted to provide a mechanism for collective enforcement of the
human rights standards adopted in the lofty principles of the
166
UDHR. The U.N.’s involvement in and promotion of human rights
norms reaffirms the Organization’s commitment to the creation of
167
international human rights standards.
B. The International Human Rights Instruments’ Commitment to Rights of
Detainees
These human rights instruments, many of which the U.N. played a
role in creating, include an express commitment to the rights of
detainees. The UDHR outlines several rights that may be implicated
in the use of Executive Order detentions like those occurring in
Kosovo. First, in Article 3, the UDHR states that everyone has the
168
right to liberty. The UDHR also recognizes an individual’s right to
translated document with its principles translated into more than 300 languages), at
http://www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/record.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file
with the American University Law Review). While such a feat does not testify to the
universal recognition of the document, it is a testament to the push, at least within
the UNHCHR office, to promulgate the statement of universal rights to all corners of
the world.
162. See David Weissbrodt, An Introduction to the Sources of International Human
Rights Law, C399 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 1, 9 (1989) (crediting the U.N. with the codification of
international human rights law).
163. See MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (3d ed.
1999) (enumerating rights listed in the European Human Rights Convention). This
Comment will not discuss the international human rights conventions relevant to
regions outside of Europe as they are not relevant to a discussion of UNMIK.
However, it must be noted that other regions, such as the member States of the
Organization of American States, have also adopted regional human rights
instruments. Id. at 272-73.
164. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222 [hereinafter ECHR].
165. See, e.g., id. art. 2 (protecting against the arbitrary deprivation of one’s life).
166. See European Court of Human Rights, Historical Background, Organisation and
Procedure ¶ 1 (Jan. 2003) (citing the impetus of drafting the ECHR as the need to
assure there were means of “collective enforcement” of UDHR), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/EDocs/HistoricalBackground.htm. (on file with the
American University Law Review).
167. See supra notes 152, 162 and accompanying text (recognizing the U.N.’s role
in shaping modern human rights law).
168. UDHR, supra note 153, at art. 3.
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“effective remedy by the competent national tribunal” for violation of
169
The subsequent article provides that “no one shall be
rights.
170
thus explicitly
subjected to arbitrary arrest [or] detention,”
condemning such practices. Finally, Article 10 states that “everyone is
entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
171
tribunal.”
Taken together, these articles emphasize that those in
detention should receive a hearing and that they should be provided
with a means for remedy if none exists.
Similarly, the ICCPR provides guidance on the rights of
172
detainees. It states that “[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary
173
arrest or detention” and that those who are arrested should be
174
notified promptly of the charges. In addition, the ICCPR provides
175
that a defendant should “be brought promptly before a judge” and
176
The
should be “entitled to take proceedings before a court.”
ICCPR only allows derogation from these principles in case of exigent
177
circumstances.
Some of these provisions have become customary
178
international law creating a binding obligation on States.
Finally, the ECHR also includes provisions clarifying the rights and
179
remedies of detainees. Article 5 enumerates an individual’s “right
180
to liberty and security of person.” Much like the ICCPR, the ECHR
mandates that those arrested be informed in their own language of
181
the charges against them and be “brought promptly before a
182
The Article makes clear that a trial must be held within a
judge.”
183
reasonable time of detention and that the detainee must be
184
released “if the detention is not lawful.” Unique in the ECHR is a
provision that mandates that those arrested or detained in
contravention to Article 5 should “have an enforceable right to
169. Id. art. 8.
170. Id. art. 9.
171. Id. art. 10.
172. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at art. 9 (outlining the rights and procedures
taken to those who are or might be detained).
173. ICCPR, supra note 154, art. 9(1).
174. Id. art. 9(2).
175. Id. art. 9(3).
176. Id. art. 9(4).
177. See id. at art. 4(1)-(3) (stating that derogation may occur “in the time of
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”).
178. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10 (recognizing that several practices are
prohibited under customary international law, including prolonged arbitrary
detention and violations of internationally recognized human rights).
179. ECHR, supra note 164, at art. 5
180. Id. art. 5(1).
181. Id. art. 5(2).
182. Id. art. 5(3).
183. Id. art. 5(4).
184. Id. art. 5(4).
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compensation.” The express attention to the rights of detainees in
the UDHR, ICCPR, and ECHR, as well as the broad acceptances of
these standards, emphasizes the importance of affording human
rights in detention situations.
C. Applying International Human Rights Instruments to the U.N.
Despite the broad scope and acceptance of these human rights
standards, it is evident that their full application is lacking. The
norms created by these documents should be applicable to the U.N.
186
when it performs state functions.
While the U.N. has been
instrumental in the creation of international human rights
187
standards, the U.N. itself is not a signatory to these conventions
since the drafters write conventions from the perspective of States
188
and expressly recognize States as signatories.
Additionally, some
185. Id. art. 5(5).
186. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 456-57 (clarifying the non-sequitor in which U.N.
personnel are allowed to take on functions performed by state actors but not held to
comparable obligations).
Wilde attributes this shortcoming to two factors:
(1) because international law assumes that international organizations and States
perform different functions; and (2) because administration of a territory is
considered temporary. Id. at 457-58; see supra note 10 and accompanying text
(outlining some provisions of human rights treaties that have gained the status of
custom and thus are also binding on states). But see C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF
THE INSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 240 (James Crawford &
David Johnston eds., 1996) (arguing that although international organizations do
not exercise the same powers as States, they do enter into agreements that “could
give rise to international obligations”).
187. See U.N. CHARTER pmbl. (noting that one of the purposes of the U.N. is “to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights”). The charter also states in Section a
that the General Assembly (G.A.) will promote the development of international law
and its codification and stating in section b that the G.A. should assist “in the
realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms.” Id. art. 13, para. 1; see Jose
E. Alvarez, The New Treaty Makers, 25 B.C. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 213, 217-18 (2002),
citing ROY LEE, MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING AND NEGOTIATION TECHNIQUES: AN
APPRAISAL IN CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF
GEORG SCHWARTZENBERGER ON HIS EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY 157-58, 177-216 (Bin Chang &
Edward Brown eds., 1998) (crediting international organizations with the rise in
regulation of prominent sectors of international law, such as international human
rights law, through treaties).
188. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl. (beginning with “[t]he States Parties to
the present Covenant”); see also ICESCR, supra note 155, at pmbl. (beginning with
“[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant”). The language of the preamble of
both conventions explicitly recognizes the obligations as relating to States rather
than international legal personalities. But see U.N., HUMAN RIGHTS, A COMPILATION
OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING
TO NATIONAL OR ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES 140, art. 9, U.N. Doc.
ST/HR/1/Rev.5, U.N. Sales No. E94.XIV.1 (Vol. I, Part 1) (1994) (specifying that
“specialized agencies and other organizations of the United Nations system shall
contribute to the full realization of the rights and principles set forth in the present
Declaration, within their respective fields of competence”). While Article 1
emphasizes the importance of States adopting legislation to achieve the declarations
aims, Article 9 makes clear an intent of the G.A. to extend obligations to the entire
U.N. It must be noted that resolutions of the G.A. are not considered binding.
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scholars argue that such obligations should not be imposed upon an
189
international organization because it has not consented.
Nonetheless, human rights law should be applied to an
international organization functioning as a State. First, despite the
lack of binding status of human rights conventions and declarations
on the U.N., the Organization has recognized in its Charter a
190
commitment to the promotion of these principles.
These
conventions are in fact the expansion and development of the
191
As such, even though the U.N. is
principles of the U.N. Charter.
not a signatory, it is obligated to follow international human rights
192
standards based on the purpose enumerated in its own charter. In
applying this argument to the administration of territories, one can
193
argue that the U.N. is the source of the law. As such, the U.N. must
enforce adherence to international human rights standards and
194
provide a means of remedy for violations.
Second, the UDHR and ICCPR recognize that obligations may be
attached to non-state entities, thus supporting the application of
human rights law to the U.N. Article 30 of the UDHR and Article 5
of the ICCPR recognize that “any State, group or person” may not
derogate from the rights and freedoms enumerated in each
195
instrument. Under a broad interpretation of the term “group,” the
U.N. should be included since it is an intergovernmental
196
organization stepping in for the State.
Consequently, the UDHR
189. See SCHERMERS & BLOKKER, supra note 118, § 1572 (raising the question of
whether international organizations, which do not possess the traditional
characteristics of a State, such as territory, may be bound by the standards of
international law and customary international law without their consent); see also
supra Part III.A (discussing U.N. accountability in humanitarian law).
190. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
191. See U.N. CHARTER art. 13, para. 1 (“The General Assembly shall initiate studies
and make recommendations for the purposes of . . . promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the progressive development of
international law and its codification.”).
192. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1 (stating that the purposes of the U.N. are to
“maintain international peace and security” and “to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace” by conforming to “principles
of justice and international law”).
193. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6 (charging the U.N. with the
duty of administering the interim administration, including many of the functions of
a State).
194. See infra Part VI (discussing the liabilities created in taking a function based
approach, which may require the creation of a claims commission); see also Rawski,
supra note 1, at 124-25 (arguing that broad grants of immunity violate an individual’s
right to remedy).
195. UDHR, supra note 153, at art. 30; ICCPR, supra note 154, at art. 5.
196. See UDHR, supra note 153, at art. 30 (finding that the articles of the UDHR
go further than applying its delegation solely to the States by specifically mentioning
“any . . . group,” and thus the U.N. fits into this category); see also ICCPR, supra note
154, at art. 5.
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and ICCPR may be applicable to the U.N. when it performs functions
as a surrogate for the State, even though the Organization is not a
signatory and has not expressed other forms of consent. These
standards provide valuable guidelines for the administration of a
State, particularly for interim administrations because such
institutions do not have a culture of historical standards from which
197
to direct their activities. The approach also avoids the inconsistency
of results in the case of human rights standards applicable to the
territory of Kosovo. Since the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
198
(“FRY”) had only acceded to the conventions to which Yugoslavia
had signed, which did not include the ECHR, the U.N.’s adoption of
the ECHR made applicable conventions that were not binding to FRY
199
as a whole.
200
Finally, while human rights instruments recognize State Parties,
the rights are afforded to individual citizens of the State as the vehicle
201
for promoting the enumerated rights. As such, the rights continue
202
With the rights
with the individual, despite U.N. intervention.
vested in the individual, the U.N. intervention is merely a surrogate
vehicle for the administration of human rights standards applicable
203
to the community. This approach emphasizes that legal rights flow
204
to the individual with the U.N. as an intermediary.
Although not evidence of a valid legal basis for applying human
rights standards to the U.N., it is interesting to note that human
rights groups and national judiciaries often cite the ECHR and

197. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (commenting that the UDHR aids
in the understanding of the U.N. Charter and also embodies the sentiments of the
international community of signatory states).
198. FRY is presently called Serbia and Montenegro, of which Kosovo is still legally
recognized as a part.
199. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 9.
200. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 155, at pmbl.;
UDHR, supra note 153, at pmbl. All three documents emphasize that signatories are
limited to State Parties or Member States.
201. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl.; ICESCR, supra note 155, at pmbl.
(emphasizing that signatories are limited to State Parties but acknowledging that the
rights are manifest in “all members if the human family” and the “individual”).
202. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 100, at 745 (describing “human
rights” as rights that individuals should claim in a society); ICCPR, supra note 154, at
pmbl. (illustrating that despite the recognition of “State Parties” the preamble refers
to the duties individuals have to other individuals in a community). It also states that
in relation to detentions, the rights are afforded to “everyone” and “anyone.” Id.
art. 9. This language implies that because the rights are afforded to individuals
through the state, individuals themselves may be responsible for the monitoring and
implementing of rights.
203. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at pmbl. (singling out the individual as having a
duty to protect the rights set forth in the ICCPR).
204. See id.
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205

ICCPR. The use of these instruments emphasizes their importance
in providing an internationally recognized standard. While these
human rights groups and national judiciaries have not articulated the
legal basis for applying these standards, one can argue that the if
206
U.N. is a subject of international law, it is at least bound to the
conventions that have risen to the level of custom. The regular use of
these conventions as international standards, however, necessitates a
clarification of how international organizations should apply
international human rights standards, as their application may have
207
implications on enforcement and remedies. The U.N.’s role in the
208
creation of human rights law, the recognition of these obligations
209
as forming international standards, and the regular application of
210
these standards provide strong support for the use of international
human rights standards as the basis for U.N. obligations in interim
211
administrations.
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN KOSOVO
Despite uncertainty regarding accountability, the U.N. has
historically engaged in interim administrations and is likely to
212
continue its involvement.
UNMIK is one of the more recent
213
In the following
examples of U.N. involvement in state-building.
205. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, On the Establishment of the Ombudsperson
Institution in Kosovo § 1.1 (June 30, 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 2000/38]
(enumerating the ECHR and its Protocols and the ICCPR as the particular human
rights standards that should guide the Ombudsperson’s analysis), at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/reg38-00.htm (on file with the
American University Law Review).
206. See Reparation Case, supra note 75, at 179 (referring to the U.N. as an
organization that embodies internationalism).
207. See generally Rex Honey, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, in UNIVERSAL HUMAN
RIGHTS? 227, 236 (Robert G. Patman ed., 2000) (advocating the accession of
organizations like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Trade
Organization to human rights norms); UNMIK Regulation 2000/44, On the Privileges
and Immunities of the World Bank Group and its Officials in Kosovo § 2 (Aug. 10, 2000)
(clarifying the immunity status of another international organization, the World
Bank, and its personnel, but shedding no light on its human rights obligations while
working
in
Kosovo),
available
at
http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/2000/reg44-00.htm (on file with the American University Law Review).
208. See supra notes 152-62 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
211. See BROWNLIE, supra note 136, at 696-97 (arguing that while there is no system
by which to hold an international organization accountable, international law may
provide grounds for deeming actions unlawful).
212. See Wilde, supra note 22, at 586-87 (describing the U.N.’s past involvement in
territorial administrations).
213. See, e.g., UNMIK Online, UMNIK at a Glance (including in the mission’s
mandate the U.N.’s role in state-building), at http://www.unmikonline.org/
intro.htm (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law
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section, this Comment will examine the tangible consequences of the
deviation from, and lack of enforcement of, human rights standards
with the UNMIK SRSG’s use of Executive Orders for detentions. The
discussion will begin with background on the mission, the creation of
institutional checks, and the inability to correct violations despite the
creation of additional offices.
A. The Authorization of the Mission
Following the NATO bombings of the former Yugoslavia, the U.N.
deployed international personnel to assist in the rebuilding of
214
Kosovo.
Under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, the U.N.
assumed the responsibility of maintaining international peace and
security, as delegated to the Security Council in its Chapter VII
215
powers.
The mission undertook the tasks of providing
humanitarian relief, facilitating reconstruction, and overseeing the
216
Additionally, the
development of provisional institutions.
resolution expressly recognized the responsibility of the international
217
218
civilian presence in “[p]rotecting and promoting human rights.”
Matched to these responsibilities, the U.N. divided the mission into
four phases: humanitarian relief, reconstruction, institution building
219
and democratization, and a transitional administration.
To achieve these ends, the Secretary-General appointed a Special
220
Representative to oversee the territorial administration of Kosovo.
In the first regulation that the interim administration promulgated,
the SRSG announced the scope of his power to encompass legislative,
221
executive and some judicial authority. In effect, the SRSG became
the center of authority with no one but the Security Council and the
Review).
214. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12 (authorizing the deployment of civil
and security presences to Kosovo).
215. Id.
216. Id. § 11.
217. Id. § 10 (including in the international civilian presence those working in
OSCE, UNMIK and other international agencies providing humanitarian assistance
and institutional support).
218. Id. § 11(j).
219. See UNMIK at a Glance, supra note 213.
220. See U.N. Resolution 1244, supra note 12, § 6 (authorizing the SecretaryGeneral to appoint a Special Representative “to control the implementation of the
international civil presence” and “to coordinate closely with the international
security presence to ensure that both presences operate toward the same goals and
in a mutually supportive manner”).
221. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 1(1). Section 1(2) states that
the “Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint any person to
perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or
remove such person.” Id. § 1(2). The two paragraphs taken together illustrate the
almost absolute power vested in the SRSG.
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222

Secretary-General as his check.
While UNMIK Regulation 1999/1
explicitly authorizes the SRSG to assist only in administering the
judiciary, it also allows the SRSG to appoint and to remove judges,
223
which in effect creates absolute judicial authority in the SRSG.
The rationale for vesting so much authority with an international
224
actor flows from the tumultuous history of the former Yugoslavia.
In Kosovo particularly, the U.N. recognized that the decade-long
oppression under the Serbian-led Yugoslav Army made it impossible
to guarantee respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
225
without an international presence.
Furthermore, local Kosovar
Albanians, who had created parallel institutions during the years of
apartheid in provincial administration, had not been involved in
226
official regional administration for more than a decade, creating a
227
knowledge-gap in administering institutions. Additionally, with the

222. See Beauvais, supra note 14, at 1110-11 (dubbing the UNTAET authority of
the administration of East Timor as the “de facto governmental authority,” much like
the mission in Kosovo); see also UNTAET Regulation 1999/1, supra note 9, § 1
(indicating that all legislative authority, executive authority, and judicial
administration is vested in UNTAET for exercise by the Transitional Administrator).
Interestingly, the language of UNTAET Regulation 1999/1 mirrors UNMIK
Regulation 1999/1. While Secion 2 of both regulations recognize international
human rights standards as those that will govern the mission, the UNTAET
Regulation explicitly enumerates the conventions that will be applicable to the
interim administration. Id. § 2.
223. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
224. By the time of the Kosovo crisis, the U.N. had been involved in two other
missions in the former Yugoslavia, one in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a temporary
mission in Slavonia in Croatia. See generally RICHARD WEST, TITO: THE RISE AND FALL
OF YUGOSLAVIA (1999) (providing historical perspective on the formation and
disintegration of Yugoslavia).
225. See generally LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF A NATION
(1997) (describing the splintering of the Republics of former Yugoslavia); see also TIM
JUDAH, KOSOVO: WAR AND REVENGE (2000) (recounting the events leading the
bombing of Kosovo and its consequences). Ironically, while the criticism for the last
decade had been of the Serbian oppression of Kosovars Albanian, one phenomenon
of the end of the war was Kosovar Albanian retaliation against remaining Serb
populations and other ethnic minorities who were accused of being complicit or
outright supporting the Serb regime while it was in power in Kosovo. Id. at 295. But
see Nataša Kandi , The Lesson of Orahovac: The International Administration in Kosovo
Encourages Violence Against Serbs, Feb. 1, 2000 (accusing UNMIK, OSCE and KFOR of
supporting the violence committed against Serb minority communities in
southeastern Kosovo), at http://www.kosovo.com/ orahovac.html (on file with the
American University Law Review).
226. See NOEL MALCOLM, KOSOVO: A SHORT HISTORY 349 (1999) (recounting the
history of human rights abuses against Kosovar Albanians and their dismissal from
positions in schools and hospitals).
227. See OSCE, Factsheet: OSCE and Capacity-Building (June 2002) (listing cooperation as one of the challenges of capacity-building in Kosovo since its citizens
have a long history of working in parallel structures), available at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/factsheet/general/capacitybuilding_
factsheeteng.pdf (on file with the American University Law Review).
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fear of reprisal, as witnessed in other missions, the U.N. hesitated to
229
With these factors
vest full and immediate control in local hands.
in mind, the SRSG deemed it best to centralize authority as
230
promulgated in UNMIK Regulation 1999/1.
B. Creation of Institutional Checks
231

Responding to an earlier commitment of the mission, the first
SRSG Bernard Kouchner initiated the creation of an
232
Ombudsperson’s office. The mandate assigned the Ombudsperson
to “promote and protect the rights and freedoms of individuals and
233
legal entities.”
Although appointed by the SRSG, the
234
The
Ombudsperson was to act independently and free of charge.
jurisdiction of the office extended to the investigation of “complaints
from any person or entity in Kosovo concerning human rights
violations and actions constituting an abuse of authority by the
interim civil administration or any emerging central or local
235
institution.”
The mandate explicitly authorized the application of
236
237
the ECHR and its Protocols and the ICCPR.
228. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Bosnia-Herzegovina:
The International
Community’s Responsibility, Jan. 6, 1996, at 45-48 (describing the revenge attacks
following peace settlements in Bosnia).
229. See generally Kosovo Temporary Media Commissioner, Report 2000-2001,
available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/bodies/tmc/pdf/tmcreport.pdf (last visited
July 8, 2003) (on file with the American University Law Review). In one of the most
egregious incidents of local reprisal, the local Albanian-language newspaper Dita
published the name, workplace and route of travel of a Serbian man working for
UNMIK. Id. at 7. The newspaper accused him of working for the Serb regime
during the NATO bombing of Kosovo. Id. The man was later found dead. Id.
While the OSCE condemned the acts and placed sanctions on Dita, such types of
allegations continued, creating an atmosphere of fear and hostility between the
majority Albanian community and the ethnic minorities within the territory of
Kosovo. Id.
230. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 1 (vesting authority in the
SRSG for effectively all government functions).
231. See OSCE Permanent Council, PC Journal No. 237, Agenda Item 2, Dec. No.
305, July 1, 1999 [hereinafter OSCE, Decision 305] (including in its mandate that
the OSCE would facilitate the creation of an Ombudsperson Institute), available at
http://www.osce.org/docs/english/pc/1999/decisions/pced305.pdf (on file with
the American University Law Review).
232. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205 (directing the SRSG to
appoint an Ombudsperson in Kosovo to ensure UNMIK complies with the U.N.
Security Council resolution standard of human rights for the region).
233. Id. § 1.1. See generally Linda C. Reif, Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of
National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection, 13
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 19-23 (2000) (outlining the role which ombudspersons
institutions may play in promoting human rights in the State).
234. UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205, § 2.1-2.2.
235. Id. § 3.1.
236. See id. § 1.1 (ensuring that all persons of Kosovo can exercise those human
rights and fundamental freedoms provided by the international human rights
standards of the ECHR). The SRSG authorized the application of ECHR even
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Despite widespread support for creating the institution, numerous
constraints delayed the establishment of the office and the
appointment of an Ombudsperson until nearly the end of the second
238
year of the mission.
In addition, the mandate expressly excluded
the Kosovo Force (“KFOR”) from the jurisdiction of the
239
The regulation limited the Ombudsperson’s
Ombudsperson.
authority to submitting reports and recommendations to the KFOR
240
commander based on the complaints the Ombudsperson received.
241
The inclusion
The KFOR commander determines further action.
of the international military presence under the mandate of the
Ombudsperson is a noticeable step forward in recognizing the
responsibility of peacekeeping troops. As NATO-deployed troops,
KFOR falls directly under the oversight of an international
organization and works in coordination with the U.N. While
documents such as the Bulletin open the way for military forces of
international organizations to be held accountable for war time
conduct, the limited jurisdiction of the Ombudsperson over KFOR
point to the ever-present gap in the realm of human rights law over
military forces.
C. U.N. and KFOR Abuse of Privileges and Immunities
Since it became operational, the Ombudsperson’s office has been
242
handling a full caseload with considerable focus on the abuses of
though Yugoslavia, the country of which Kosovo remained a part, had not become a
party to the agreement. Id.; see supra Part III (discussing the application of human
rights standards to the U.N.). Although this Comment does not discuss the
implications of this arrangement, this situation creates an interesting wrinkle in that
the source of the law is actually the interim state rather than the host state. In the
Kosovo Mission, the U.N. undertook obligations the government of the former
Yugoslavia may not find legally valid.
237. See id. § 1.1 (ensuring that all persons of Kosovo can exercise those human
rights and fundamental freedoms provided by the international human rights
standards of the ICCPR); see also United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral
Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, ICESCR (listing Yugoslavia as having
ratified the ICESCR in 1967, 1971, and again Mar. 12, 2001, after the break up of its
republic), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternet
bible/partI/chapterIV/treaty5.asp#N2 (last visited July 8, 2003) (on file with the
American University Law Review).
238. See generally OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Independent Bodies-Ombudsperson’s
Institution (mentioning that presently the Permanent Council of the OSCE and the
United States provide funding for the Ombudsperson Institute), at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/bodies/ombudsperson/ (last visited July 8, 2003) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
239. UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205, § 3.5.
240. Id. In part, this distinction is made for KFOR since the troops deployed in
Kosovo came under NATO auspices, rather than directly under U. N. command, so
that KFOR operates in coordination with UNMIK.
241. Id.
242. OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTE OF KOSOVO, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 105.
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U.N. and KFOR.
In Special Report No. 1, Ombudsperson Marek
Antoni Nowicki questioned the compatibility of UNMIK privileges
and immunities under UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 with
international human rights standards following complaints that
244
KFOR had occupied or damaged private property.
The report
concluded that the UNMIK Regulation on privileges and immunities
was incompatible with the ECHR standard for international human
245
rights. The Ombudsperson recommended that the SRSG establish
a Claims Commission to address the complaints of the citizenry,
ensure dissemination of this information to the public, and take steps
246
to encourage KFOR compliance and compensation for damages.
Although the report focused on the privileges and immunities of
KFOR, the Ombudsperson also drew attention to the consolidation of
247
power within the office of the SRSG.
The Ombudsperson noted
that investing the powers of two branches within the SRSG was
contrary to fundamental principles of law when there was no judicial
248
review, as is the case when applying UNMIK Regulation 2000/47.
Additionally, civilians did not have access to the regulation because it
was written only in English and had not been translated to Serbian or
249
Albanian, the languages spoken by the local populations.
The
combination of overbroad protections and the lack of information to
the citizenry leads to potential abuses. Accordingly, Nowicki argued
that the UNMIK Regulation 2000/47 did not protect citizens from
250
the arbitrary application of law by the government.

The annual report cited that approximately 1,000 persons visited the Institution
following its opening and these persons lodged 344 formal complaints. Id. at 2. Of
the applications filed, the Ombudsperson rejected about sixty percent. Id. Of the
344 applications filed, the subject matter of the cases divided as follows: property
issues such as governmental takings, 141 cases; employment issues, 92 cases; fair trial
issues, 38 cases; and personal liberty and security issues, 30 cases. Id. at 8. The
remaining cases dealt with impunity, abuse of authority, standard of living, right to
respect for the home, freedom from inhuman or degrading treatment, and equal
protection. Id. at 9.
243. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, supra note 108, ¶ 2.
244. Id.
245. Id. ¶ 82.
246. Id. ¶ 84.
247. Id. ¶ 24.
248. Id.
249. Id. ¶ 25.
250. Id. ¶ 27. See generally Press Release, Amnesty International, No Impunity for
the International Community (June 18, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty, No Impunity]
(describing another incident of human rights abuse and the U.N. response to an
Austrian police officer’s alleged maltreatment of a detainee), at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR70052002?open&of=ENG-YUG (on
file with the American University Law Review).
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D. Executive Orders for Detention
1.

The Ombudsperson on detentions
Bearing in mind this ineffectiveness of the UNMIK system, the
Ombudsperson issued a comprehensive report outlining the
problems with Executive Order detentions based on the applicable
251
human rights law. The issue of the incompatibility of law in Special
252
Report No. 1 became the focus of Special Report No. 3 in which the
Ombudsperson addressed the issue of “Conformity of Deprivations of
Liberty under ‘Executive Orders’ with Recognized International
253
Standards.”
The SRSG’s prolonged detention of Kosovars has
raised considerable ire against the U.N. administration among
254
255
Kosovars, international human rights organizations, and the
256
Organization of Security and Co-operation (“OSCE”). In analyzing
the SRSG’s obligations under regional human rights instruments, the
Ombudsperson concluded that the detentions under the Executive
Order of the SRSG were not lawful under ECHR Article 5(1), which
257
outlines an individual’s right to liberty and security.
The
Ombudsperson emphasized the necessity of judicial review over
258
detentions. As noted earlier, the Ombudsperson viewed the vesting
251. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT 3, supra note 14.
252. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT 1, supra note 108.
253. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT 3, supra note 14.
254. See generally Kosovapress News Agency, Protests Continue Over Kosovo Albanian’s
Extended Detention, Sept. 1, 2000 (reporting that more than 500 protesters gathered in
a village in eastern Kosovo to demand the release of Afrim Zeqiri who was being held
under SRSG Orders).
255. See Press Release, Amnesty International, Criminal Justice System Still on
Trial (Nov. 23, 2000) [hereinafter Amnesty, Criminal Justice] (raising concerns
regarding whether a judge had authorized the prolonged detention of Zeqiri who
was arrested in May 2000), at http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/
ENGEUR700632000?open&of=ENG-YUG (on file with the American University Law
Review); Amnesty, Afrim Zeqiri, supra note 17 (criticizing SRSG Hans Haekkerup’s
continued detention of Zeqiri after the initial Executive Orders had expired and
without legal process); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 2002 EUROPE:
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA (2002) (stating that the Detention Review
Commission “failed to provide detainees with the means to challenge their
detention.”), available at http://www.amnesty.org (on file with the American
University Law Review).
256. See OSCE, LSMR 2, supra note 13 (criticizing pre-trial detention orders); see
also OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and Rule of Law, Review
of the Criminal Justice System: September 2001-February 2002, at 45-46 (2002) [hereinafter
OSCE, LSMR 4] (criticizing Executive Order detentions).
257. ECHR, supra note 164, at art. 5(1) (“Everyone has the right to liberty and
security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases
and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.”). Article 5 goes on to specify
the parameters of detention and arrest. See infra note 259.
258. OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14, ¶ 17 (concluding that
the centralization of authority in the SRSG violated the principle of separation of
powers).
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of judicial administration in the SRSG as creating a prima facie
violation of the ECHR because the SRSG could effectively deny
259
judicial review to a detainee.
2.

Abuses of detention
a.

The case of Afrim Zeqiri: Institutional checks without the teeth

The SRSG’s use and abuse of executive orders in Kosovo
demonstrates the problems that arise from a virtually unchecked
centralized authority. The case of Afrim Zeqiri emphasizes the need
to rethink the means by which the Security Council applied and
enforced human rights standards on interim administrations. U.N.
police arrested Zeqiri, an ethnic Albanian, for the murder of three
Serbs and the attempted murder of two in the Kosovo village
260
Cernica.
He was arrested in May 2000 and held him based on
judicial detention orders until late July 2000. Following the lapse of
the judicial detention order, Bernard Kouchner extended Zeqiri’s
261
262
detention pursuant to UNMIK Regulation 1999/26 because local
263
prosecutors chose to abandon the case.
In September 2000, an
international investigating judge permitted another thirty-day
264
When the series of executive orders and judicial
extension.
259. Id. ¶ 21; see also ECHR, supra note 164, at art. 5, ¶ 3 (“Everyone arrested or
detained in accordance with the provision of para. 1.c. of this articles shall be
brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise
judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release
pending trial.”).
260. Kouchner Prolongs Detention of Albanian Murder Suspect, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
July 29, 2000 [hereinafter Kouchner Prolongs Detention], available at
http://www.balkanpeace.org/hed/archive/ july00/hed400.shtml (on file with the
American University Law Review). See Interview with Michael Hartmann, UNMIK
International Prosecutor Feb. 2000-Jan. 2003 and prosecutor for the Zeqiri case
(June 2003) (noting that “Serb reaction to this ethnic hatred motivated attack caused
severe public order and political problems for UNMIK, which had been criticized by
NGOs and OSCE for failing to adequately protect minority rights and safety.”).
Statements are his personal opinion, and do not necessary reflect the position of
UNMIK.
261. Kouchner Prolongs Detention, supra note 260.
262. UNMIK Regulation 1999/26, On the Extension of Periods of Pre-trial Detention,
Dec. 22, 1999 [hereinafter UNMIK Regulation 1999/26] (permitting an Ad Hoc
Court of Final Appeal to extend pre-trial custody for up to six months), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg26-99.htm. (last visited July 26,
2003) (on file with the American University Law Review).
263. Interview with Michael Hartman, supra note 260 (noting that Kouchner
decided to extend the detention of murderers because the local judiciary’s decision
to pursue the case seemed founded on ethnic bias).
264. Press Briefing, UNMIK, Zeqiri (Sept. 15, 2000), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/trans/tr150900.html (on file with the American
University Law Review). See Interview with Michael Hartmann, supra note 260
(noting that the judiciary permitted the extension of the detentions because an
international prosecutor was attempting to re-open the case). An international
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decisions to extend detention expired in November 2000, Zeqiri
265
remained in a detention center at the U.S. Army Base. In response
to the Ombudsperson’s request for clarification of the legal basis for
the prolonged detention, the Director of the Department of Judicial
Affairs wrote that Executive Order detentions were lawful based on
the broad mandate of Resolution 1244 which permitted the SRSG to
take “any measure necessary to ensure public safety and order and
266
the proper administration of justice.”
After nearly two years in
prison, KFOR released Zeqiri from detention because of the lack of
267
evidence against him.
Zeqiri’s case underscores the difficult balancing law enforcement
undertakes in interim administrations. As ethnic violence against
minorities raged, the U.N. found itself unable to curb quickly and
268
effectively the violence.
The same human rights groups that were
critical of detention orders had been pushing the U.N. to take action
269
against inter-ethnic violence.
Mounting criticism encouraged the
SRSG to take decisive measures, including the creation of Executive
Order detentions to hold those suspected of ethnic violence while

investigating judge granted the initial petition, but an appeals panel made up of a
majority of local judges reversed the decision. Id. A second attempt to re-open the
case ultimately was refused in December 2000. Id
265. Amnesty, Afrim Zeqiri, supra note 17 (protesting the continued detention of
Afrim Zeqiri after the expiration of judicial orders).
266. Letter from Fernando Castanon, Director of the Department of Judicial
Affairs, to Marek Antoni Nowicki, Ombudsperson (Mar. 29, 2001), at
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/Incoming%20Letters/29%20March%20
concerning%20the%20case%20of%20Afrim%20Zequiri%201.pdf (page one) and
http://www.ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/Incoming%20Letters/29%20March%20
concerning%20the%20case%20of%20Afrim%20Zequiri%202.pdf (page two) (on
file with the American University Law Review).
267. Interview with Michael Hartman, supra note 260 (pointing out that there was
only one eye witness for the prosecution, an ethnic Serb who was not a persuasive
witness); Court Releases Kosovo Albanian for Lack of Evidence after Two-Year Detention, BBC
MONITORING INT’L REPORTS, June 17, 2002.
268. Amnesty International, Six Months On, Climate of Violence and Fear Flies in the
Face of U.N. Mission, Dec. 23, 1999 (recognizing the U.N.’s inability to protect the
human rights of ethnic minorities in the first six months of its mission, at
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR701361999?open&of=ENG-YUG
(on file with the American University Law Review).
269. Compare Press Release, Amnesty International, FRY/Kosovo: End Deliberate
Attacks on Serb Civilians (Feb. 16, 2001) (calling on the U.N. and KFOR to take
action against the perpetrators of the Nis Express bus attacks), at
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR700032001?open&of=ENG-YUG
(on file with the American University Law Review) and Amnesty International,
Kosovo: KFOR Must Act Now to Curb Violence Against Ethnic Minorities, Jan. 13, 2000
(criticizing KFOR’s inability to prevent the murder of a Slavic Muslim family in
southern Kosovo despite the presence of more than 42,000 troops in the region), at
http://www.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR
70003200?open&of=ENG-YUG
(on file with the American University Law Review), with infra Part IV.D.2.b (noting
the prolonged detention of those involved in the bus attacks).
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investigations were pending.
Initially, the judiciary gave great
deference to the SRSG by approving extensions of detentions
271
Yet, when the courts raised concerns over the prolonged
orders.
and unjustified detentions, the SRSG made only perfunctory
272
responses.
He justified continued detentions despite more than
273
two years passage and little or no evidence implicating Zeqiri.
b.

The case of the bus bombing suspects

At the same time as Zeqiri’s detention, Amnesty International
reported that the U.N. and KFOR were holding seventy persons
274
without clarification of the legal basis for the detentions.
One of
the most notable cases was the detention of three Albanian men
arrested in connection with the bombing of the Nis Express, a shuttle
275
service for Kosovar Serbs.
Although the men were arrested in
March and a panel of international judges found no grounds for the
detention, the men remained in UNMIK custody because of
276
successive Executive Orders for their detention.
In response to protests from the Kosovo judiciary, the
Ombudsperson’s office and human rights groups, the SRSG
established a detention review commission to review Executive Order
277
detentions. However, the SRSG alone appointed the judges for the
270. See supra notes 260-62.
271. See supra note 264.
272. See supra note 266.
273. See supra note 266.
274. See Amnesty, Afrim Zeqiri, supra note 17 (noting Amnesty’s request to the
SRSG to explain the grounds for detentions); see also Interview with Michael
Hartmann, UNMIK International Prosecutor Feb. 2000-Jan. 2003 and prosecutor for
the Zeqiri case (June 2003) (recalling that the U.N. held six persons for executive
order detentions—Zeqiri, four Nis Bombing Suspects and a suspected assassin of two
Serb priests).
275. Amnesty, Executive Orders, supra note 15 (highlighting the continued
detentions of the three men in a letter to the SRSG urging him not to use Executive
Orders to detain criminal suspects); see also 2 Serbs Killed, 5 Injured in Bus Attack,
UNMIK NEWS, Newsletter No. 27, available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
pub/news/nl27.html (last visited July 8, 2002) (on file with the American University
Law Review).
276. Amnesty, Executive Orders, supra note 15; see also Press Release, UNMIK,
UNMIK/PR/394, Background Note on Zeqiri Detention (Oct. 18, 2000) (justifying
Zeqiri’s detention by executive order on the basis of the SRSG’s ultimate
responsibility “for providing a safe and secure environment and maintaining the
public safety and order in Kosovo” under U.N. Resolution 1244), at
http://www.unmikonline.org/press/press/pr394.html (on file with the American
University Law Review).
277. UNMIK Regulation 2001/18, On the Establishment of a Detention Review
Commission for Extra-Judicial Detentions Based on Executive Orders, Aug. 25, 2001
[hereinafter
UNMIK
Regulation
2001/18],
available
at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg18-01.pdf (on file with the
American University Law Review).
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review commission, creating an insular relation.
When the
commission reviewed the detention of the Nis Express bombing
suspects, it found the detention lawful and extended the period of
279
pre-trial custody of the suspects for an additional three months.
The OSCE, on the other hand, reported that there was never
280
sufficient evidence to detain the persons.
Although the SRSG has informal checks such as the
Ombudsperson’s office, the Kosovo judiciary, and the OSCE, these
281
bodies do not have the authority to correct the SRSG’s abuses.
While the creation of a commission was a commendable effort to
correct problems arising from unlawful detention, it did not have
sufficient independence from the SRSG to provide meaningful
282
oversight.
As a result, the possible use of Executive Order
detentions remains intact, despite condemnation from human rights
groups and local institutions for the lack of compliance with human
283
rights standards.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS TO CORRECT ABUSE OF DETENTION ORDERS
The use of unlawful detentions supports the idea that increasing
U.N. accountability is tantamount to effective interim
284
While the U.N.’s role in future interim
administrations.
278. Id. § 2.1; see Press Release, UNMIK, UNMIK/PR/637, SRSG Establishes
Detention Review Commission (Sept. 3, 2001) (announcing the SRSG’s intention to
create a special detention review commission to provide an extra-judicial check on
administrative actions), at http://www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/press-r/pr637.
html (on file with the American University Law Review).
279. Press Release, UNMIK, UNMIK/PR/649, Detention Review Commission
Supports Detention of Bus Bombing Suspects (Sept. 21, 2001), at http://
www.unmikonline.org/press/2001/press-r/pr649.html (on file with the American
University Law Review).
280. See OSCE, LSMR 4, supra note 256, at 46 (arguing that “the current status of
the [Nis Express case] proves that there has never been enough evidence against the
suspects and that the executive intervention was only meant to keep the suspects
detained while investigators were expected to collect evidence against them”).
281. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205, § 4.1 (limiting the
Ombudsperson’s power to the ability to investigate, to make recommendations, and
to advise the parties in dispute); UNMIK Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, § 1(1)
(recognizing that the SRSG exercises authority over administration of the judiciary);
OSCE, Decision 305, supra note 231 (delegating to the OSCE capacities of
monitoring and reporting, but with no mention of any authority over other pillars of
the U.N. mission in Kosovo).
282. See OSCE, LSMR 4, supra note 256, at 45-46 (noting that the SRSG flew in
specially recruited judges for the commission for merely one day to review Executive
Order detentions).
283. But see OSCE, LSMR 4, supra note 256, at 45 (acknowledging the decrease in
the number of Executive Order detentions). Although the number of persons
detained by the KFOR fluctuated, overall it significantly decreased from 100 persons
in September 2001 to one person in February 2002. Id.
284. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing the potential problems
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administrations remains uncertain, the use of Executive Order
detentions in Kosovo underscores the importance of institutional
285
checks. The Ombudsperson’s Office, the OSCE and human rights
groups have attempted to bring light to this issue by providing
286
analysis and discourse on human rights standards.
Unfortunately,
these institutions do not have the political clout in the interim
administration to counteract human rights violations beyond their
287
role of giving recommendations. Since the only check on the SRSG
is through the Security Council or the Secretary-General, the check is
an impractical means to hold the SRSG accountable for human rights
violations that do not rise to a level of egregiousness that sounds
288
international alarms.
Many times, Executive Order detentions do
not appeal to some of the sensationalist media outlets that focus on
torture, genocide and rape; however, it is important to remember
that unlawful detentions take away a person’s freedom to move and
constitute the ultimate restraint on liberty.
There are a number of ways in which the U.N. may be able to
correct for the type of shortcomings exhibited by the practice of
Executive Order detentions. First, the U.N. needs to focus on the
role of the judiciary in interim administrations and the meaningful
289
distribution of power to such offices.
The involvement of a
judiciary ensures an independent check on the interim
290
administration and a de-centralization of power. Although this may
not be possible at the outset of a humanitarian intervention
291
mission, U.N. personnel must give deference to an independent

encountered when international organizations administer inconsistently espoused
principles). See generally Wilde, supra note 1, at 460 (advocating analysis of how to
make U.N. actors more accountable for their conduct in interim administrations).
285. See supra Part IV.D (examining the problems with Executive Order
detentions). See generally Amnesty, Criminal Justice, supra note 255 (insisting pre-trial
detentions remain exclusively a judicial function).
286. See supra Part IV.D.
287. See supra note 281 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations of these
organizations’ ability to check the SRSG).
288. See, e.g., supra Part IV.A (noting that peace-keeping violations did not stir
attention until reports of egregious conduct surfaced).
289. See supra note 248 and accompanying text; see also Amnesty, Criminal Justice,
supra note 255 (condemning administrative detentions for their lack of judicial
review). See generally Hansjörg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial
System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 46, 6162 (2001) (prioritizing the development of the judiciary as part of the U.N.’s “firstphase response” to civil society development).
290. Id.
291. Wendy Betts, et al., The Post Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo and
the Lessons Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L.
371, 376-79 (2001) (outlining the challenges in establishing the Kosovo judiciary
following U.N. intervention).
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292

judiciary, particularly when such a body determines that the SRSG
293
The SRSG, as any state
violated international human rights law.
294
actor, must respect the rule of law as it is interpreted by courts.
This may be accomplished through designation in Security Council
resolutions and increased obligations placed on the SRSG to conform
295
to international human rights standards. As with any State violating
human rights norms, if the U.N. wishes to thwart human rights based
on an exigency justification, it must outline the nature of the
296
exigency and the dangers posed to the public.
Second, the SRSG could have moved controversial cases into the
domain of international judges who had been incorporated into the
297
local judicial system, a common practice in war crimes cases tried
locally. The broad U.N. regulation permitted the transfer of cases
298
whenever there was fear of ethnic bias.
The use of this feature,
which existed at the time of these cases, would allow for continued
development of the fledging judicial system while balancing the
299
exigency concerns of the SRSG.
Through such action, the SRSG
292. See Wilde, supra note 1, at 457 (noting that the interpretation of U.N.
mandates has permitted the actions of international officials to go unchallenged by
the judiciary).
293. See supra Part IV.D.2.b and accompanying text. See generally UNMIK
Regulation 1999/1, supra note 6, at 1.1 (limiting the SRSG’s judicial powers to
administration of the judiciary). See also Betts et al., supra note 291, at 387
(emphasizing the importance of an independent judiciary that upholds human
rights standards).
294. See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
295. See, e.g., U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (designating which human rights
conventions the Security Council considered applicable to the mission).
296. See ICCPR, supra note 154, at art. 4(3) (requiring that States that derogate
from the ICCPR stipulate the reasons for derogation to the Secretary-General of the
U.N.); see also United Nations, Human Rights Committee, General Comment 29,
State of Emergency (article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (2001)
(outlining the pre-conditions necessary to designate a state of emergency that
permits derogation from human rights standard).
297. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, On the Appointment and Removal from Office of
International Judges and International Prosecutors (Feb. 15, 2000) [hereinafter UNMIK
Regulation 2000/6] (establishing the integration of international judges in the
Kosovo judiciary), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2000/
reg06-00.htm. (on file with the American University Law Review).
The U.N. had attempted to make a separate war crimes court in Kosovo, but the
U.N. could not secure funding for the proposal. Adrian Foreman, New War Crimes
Court in Kosovo, BBC NEWS, Apr. 26, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/727531.stm (last visited Aug. 30, 2003). Eventually, the U.N. incorporated
international judges and prosecutors for cases where ethnic bias was a concern. See
supra UNMIK Regulation 2000/6.
298. UNMIK Regulation 2000/6, supra note 297.
299. See E-mail from Clive Baldwin, formerly of the OSCE Department of Human
Rights and Rule of Law, in Prishtina, Kosovo, to the author (Mar. 15, 2003) (on file
with the American University Law Review) (suggesting that the SRSG could have
used the existing international judges, who had been appointed as part of the Kosovo
judicial system, to deal with cases where evidence may have been sensitive).
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would be enabling conformity to international human rights for both
the U.N. and the defendant. The U.N. would be subject to the
300
requirement of judicial scrutiny, and the defendant would have
been brought before an impartial arbitrator who would not be
301
subject to local political whims.
Finally, if the SRSG feared the lack of independence from a local
judiciary, even with international judges, the U.N. should have
provided for the hybridization of authority rather than complete
302
usurpation of judicial involvement. Following criticism from several
watchdog institutions, the SRSG instituted an independent
303
commission to evaluate the Executive Order detentions.
One
problem with the commission was its lack of independence and
diversity, which could have been resolved through hybridization in its
304
membership. To add credibility to the commission, the U.N. could
have appointed existing international judges working in Kosovo or
required that appointments be made in consultation with the
judiciary. The hybridization of the commission to include input from
the SRSG, as well as the judiciary, increases the likelihood that the
305
body would put forth independent opinions.
The concepts of redistribution and hybridization of authority are
ways to create a fair administration and to enforce international
human rights standards. While acknowledging the need for quick
action in humanitarian intervention, the current application of
Executive Orders in Kosovo does not provide sufficient institutional

300. See OMBUDSPERSON INSTITUTION IN KOSOVO, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 4, ON THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF A DETENTION REVIEW COMMISSION FOR EXTRA-JUDICIAL DETENTION
BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDERS ¶ 25 (Aug. 25, 2001) [hereinafter OMBUDSPERSON,
SPECIAL REPORT NO. 4] (suggesting that the lack of judicial oversight of Executive
Order detentions creates an inherent conflict with ECHR), at http://www.
ombudspersonkosovo.org/doc/spec%20reps/pdf/sr4.pdf (on file with the American
University Law Review). The Report went on to recommend that panels with
international judges be formed to review the practice of executive order detentions
to suggest means by which they may comply with international standards. Id. ¶ 27.
301. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 222 (recognizing that everyone has the right to a fair
trial before an independent and impartial tribunal).
302. Interestingly, the SRSG extended the detention of the Nis bombers through
the time of local elections, in which many western nations wanted Serb participation.
These extended detentions were allowed to lapse quietly following the elections.
303. See supra Part IV.D.2.b (outlining the institution of the Detention Review
Commission).
304. See UNMIK Regulation 2001/18, supra note 277 (authorizing that the SRSG
alone select the judges for the detention review commission).
305. See, e.g., OSCE, LSMR 2, supra note 13 (recommending the incorporation of
international judges to improve the application of human rights standards). See
OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 4, supra note 300 (recognizing the importance
of judicial review in the detention process).
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306

checks.
Current regulations permit up to six months of
307
detention, which arguably already violates international human
308
rights norms as embodied in the ECHR, the ICCPR and the UDHR.
Since instruments like the ECHR emphasize the need for judicial
authorization in detentions, the extra-judicial authorization of
prolonged detentions violates concepts of hybridization and
309
redistribution of authority. Judicial involvement in these processes
would serve to legitimize the executive’s action and to provide a
310
Measures such as
needed check in an interim administration.
these, though requiring some additional time, are ways to increase
conformity to international human rights standards to which even
311
international organizations should be held.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW TO THE U.N.
By advancing a more powerful role to the judiciary through
hybridization and redistribution of authority, the U.N. may be able to
312
curb the unchecked abuses of its personnel.
In such a system,
adoption and enforcement of a function-based approach to human
rights obligations may provide the legal basis for U.N.
313
accountability.
This approach has several important practical
implications for the operation of the U.N. First, application of
human rights to the U.N. will mean a rethinking of the concept of
314
privileges and immunities within missions.
The broad
authorization of immunities is unworkable as it provides little or no
means to bring claims against those acting in an administrative

306. Amnesty, Criminal Justice, supra note 255.
307. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/26, supra note 262 (permitting up to an
additional six months of administrative ordered detentions for pre-trial custodial
arrests).
308. See OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14 (discussing the
findings of the Ombudsperson that certain Executive Orders issued by the SRSG
resulted in deprivations of liberty and are inconsistent with recognized international
standards).
309. See ECHR, supra note 164, art. 6(1) (“[e]veryone arrested or detained . . .
shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power.”).
310. See OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 3, supra note 14 (noting the need for
judicial checks on Executive Orders).
311. See Bongiorno, supra note 1 (arguing for the application of human rights law
to the U.N. in East Timor in response to the existing “culture” of impunity).
312. See supra Part IV (discussing the U.N. Mission in Kosovo and abuses by the
U.N. and KFOR of privileges and immunities).
313. See supra Part II.B.2.
314. See Rawski, supra note 1, at 132 (advocating that privileges and immunities be
aligned with human rights standards in order to increase the integrity of future U.N.
governance operations).
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capacity. When combined with the lack of meaningful institutional
checks, victims of human rights violations are completely left without
316
recourse. The grant of privileges and immunities, while necessary,
must be tailored in a manner to compensate those harmed in the
317
implementation of administrative policy.
Second, the adoption of a function-based model creates the
obvious question of when and what human rights standards are
318
applicable, as missions vary significantly in mandate. One solution
would be to have the U.N. articulate which conventions should
319
apply.
In creating mission mandates, the Security Council could
320
However, as
enumerate the applicable human rights standards.
history demonstrates, self-monitoring can be problematic because the
321
U.N. is not always forthcoming in applying standards to itself.
Alternatively, the U.N. may evoke the laws applicable to a territory
based on the conventions to which the State has already become a
322
signatory. As such, the rights would be a continuation of the duties
323
of the previous State. However, problems may arise in this context
324
because some states will not have consented to some conventions,
and the U.N. will still be monitoring itself in continuing the State’s
325
duties.
Finally, the creation of U.N. accountability raises the more global
issue of enforcement. Applying human rights law to the U.N.
315. See supra Part II.A (relating the abuse of privileges and immunities by the
U.N. and KFOR).
316. See Amnesty, No Impunity, supra note 250 (describing the events surrounding
the alleged torture and ill-treatment of an Albanian detainee by a member of the
U.N. Civilian Police).
317. See Rawski, supra note 1, at 104-05 (arguing that while immunity protections
are necessary to shield the U.N. and its personnel, particularly in unstable political
environments where regular institutions of law and order are inoperable, such
immunities must be reconciled with basic human rights).
318. See UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 9 (enumerating the human rights
standards applicable to public officials in Kosovo acting in an official capacity); see
also U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5 (authorizing the U.N. Mission in East Timor
and specifying that public officials must observe the internationally recognized
human rights standards established in instruments such as the UDHR and the
ICCPR).
319. See U.N. Resolution 1272, supra note 5.
320. Id.
321. See supra Part III (discussing the U.N.’s belated adoption of humanitarian law
to peace-keeping operations).
322. See, e.g., UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 9, § 1 (providing that the
applicable law in Kosovo shall include the regulations promulgated by the SRSG as
well as the law that was in force in Kosovo on Mar. 22, 1989).
323. Id.
324. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/38, supra note 205 (applying in Kosovo the
rights established in the ECHR, despite the fact that Yugoslavia, to which Kosovo still
belonged, was not a signatory to the agreement).
325. See infra notes 326-30.
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326

inherently creates liabilities for the Organization, and the U.N. may
327
It is
thus be fiscally accountable for the actions of its personnel.
clear that self-monitoring is unlikely.
As suggested by the
Ombudsperson for UNMIK, the U.N. should create an independent
328
commission to adjudicate claims against the Organization.
In
addition to being valuable for a broadly-mandated mission, such as
the case in Kosovo, this type of institution would be valuable for the
329
entire U.N. system. The presence of a claims commission accessible
at the location of a mission with administrators who are not part of
the mission would facilitate compensation of victims. Furthermore, it
would provide a means of identifying institutional problems at an
earlier stage during a mission, thus providing more possibilities for
330
correcting abuses. If such an institution existed in Kosovo, it would
serve both as a deterrent against the SRSG in sidestepping
international human rights law and the mandate of the mission, and
as a means for victims to receive just compensation for grievances.
CONCLUSION
The U.N., as the harbinger of human rights standards, should be
held accountable as it continues to undertake obligations
traditionally falling under the domain of the State. While the
presence of exigent circumstances may be a legitimate reason for
centralizing authority, the rationale wears thin as three years pass in a
mission and no mechanisms for accountability are set in place. As
the U.N. is a facilitator in the development of the entire body of
international human rights law, it is only appropriate that it model
the means through which to achieve good governance.
Accountability is of fundamental importance in the success of a U.N.
mission and the successful transition of authority to local actors.
Consequently, the U.N. must provide the example to which local
actors can aspire through the application and enforcement of human
rights standards in its missions.

326. See UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, supra note 12 (providing recourse for third
parties suffering injuries through Claims Commissions established by KFOR and
UNMIK).
327. Id.
328. See OMBUDSPERSON, SPECIAL REPORT NO. 1, supra note 108, at 19
(recommending the establishment of the claims commission envisioned in Section 7
of UNMIK Regulation 2000/47, one that would provide individuals with access to an
independent and impartial tribunal that would protect their guaranteed civil rights).
329. Id.
330. See, e.g., supra Part IV (discussing the Ombudsperson’s contribution as an
institutional check).

